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Abstrakt 
Od znovusjednocení v roce 1990 se Německo snaží o vývoj své identity reprezentující 
lidi z obou bývalých bývalých německých států a na začátku dvacátého prvního století 
stále  čelí  ojedinělé  výzvě tím,  jak se pokouší  uvést  do souladu historii  svých dvou 
předchůdců, kapitalistického a komunistického Německa. Tato práce pak s ohledem na 
výše řečené zkoumá roli historického narativu vztahujícího se k budování státnosti v 
německém  kontextu.  Sleduje  zejména  způsob,  jímž  bylo  do  dějin  sjednoceného 
Německa integrováno východoněmecké povstání z roku 1953 a jakým způsobem toto 
povstání  bylo  využito  k  utváření  příběhu  roku  1989.  Konečně  pak  práce  reflektuje 
význam takového srovnání pro čistě událostní historiografii. 
Abstract
Since  reunifying  in  1990,  Germany  has  been  working  to  develop  an  identity  that 
represents the people of the two former German states. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century the country still faced unique challenges as it reconciles the stories of the 
former capitalist and communist states. First, this study investigates the role of nation-
building historical narratives and how they developed in the German context.  I then 
looks at the introduction of the 1953 East German uprising into the national history of 
unified Germany and how this event has been used to shape the narrative around the 
1989 revolution.  Finally,  it reflects on the significance of such a comparison for the 
historiography of the events. 
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11. Introduction
By 2003 reunification nationalism in Germany had reached an impasse. Thirteen years 
after  the  triumphant  political  reunification,  reunification  was  still  a  highly  political 
issue. There was resentment in the former West Germany over the huge amounts of 
annual aide given to the former East German states and disillusionment in the former 
East  over  high  unemployment  and  related  social  problems.  Rather  than  growing 
together  into  a  unified,  integrated  nation-state  Germany still  seemed  to  be  a  nation 
divided by the past. Two German societies were still telling  separate stories about their 
past without looking towards a common future. As a national-state Germany needed to 
reconsider national symbols which demonstrated that reunification was both right and 
just. The uprising of 1953 which 'im Gedächnis der Deutschen bisher kaum einen Platz 
gefunden [hat]' provided just such a symbol.1 In 2003, the fiftieth anniversary of the 
uprising was celebrated with a 'memorial  marathon'  and it  was placed alongside the 
1989 revolution in books, speeches and newspaper articles.  This essay will  consider 
how the 1953 uprising has been used by politicians and academics to rehabilitate the 
1989 revolution and build national identity and assess why linking these two events is 
so vital for the building of a new identity for reunified Germany. 
1.1 German identity and reunification
In the years after reunification, citizens of the former East  developed the perception 
that  'unification  was  done on the  terms  of  the  west2' and  their  disillusionment  was 
1 Gerhard A. Ritter 'Der “17. Juni 1953”; Eine historische Ortsbestimmungen' in Roger Engelmann & 
Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk (eds.) Volkserhebung gegen den SED-Staat: eine Bestandsaufnahme zum 17.  
Juni 1953 (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005) pp 16 – 44. p. 16
2 Caroline Wyatt 'Ten years on, disillusionment'', BBC, November 4, 1999 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/09/99/iron_curtain/503214.stm [accessed 23 May 
2011]
2evidenced in the phenomenon of 'Ostalgie' which came to the attention of the world in 
the wake of the success of the film Goodbye Lenin. Since the inception of the idea of the 
modern German nation, even before the original unification in 1871 historians played an 
important role in shaping a German national identity.  Unlike other European nations 
where the media has come to play a more prominent role than academia, historians in 
West Germany remained important voices in the discourse shaping national identity. In 
the unified Germany historians have also been instrumental in directing the discussion 
about the legacy of the East German state and the forging of a post-reunification identity 
in  Germany.  National  identities  require  stories  and  symbols  to  unify  the  imagined 
community of the nation. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the East German 
regime,  the  events  surrounding  the   fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall  in  1989  served  as  a 
cornerstone of the new all-German identity. 
1.2 New symbols for a new Germany
This study posits that as the euphoria of 1989 turned to disillusionment, some authors 
began  portraying  East  Germans  as  economic  opportunists,  who  had  wanted 
reunification primarily to access the wealth of West Germany. In his 2002 work  The 
Rise and Fall of the German Democratic Republic, Feiwel Kupferberg posits  economic 
causes for the crisis in East Germany;
[T]he  obvious  superiority  of  the  West  German  economy  gradually  eroded  popular 
support  for the regime which,  until  its  collapse had survived mainly because of the 
antifascist  credentials and accompanying mythologies of its  communist  leaders,  who 
claimed to represent a better Germany.3
3 Feiwel Kupferberg,  The Rise and Fall of the German Democratic Republic, (Transaction Publishers, 
New Brunswick and London 2002). p. 6
3Such analyses posed a danger to the cause of building a national identity based on the 
idea of a German nation which belonged together as a natural primordial whole, which 
was separated as a result of Germany's defeat in the Second World War, and which was 
brought back together as the world entered a new era. By using 1953 as a new symbol 
of German unification, the events of 1989 were given a pedigree, and the story of East 
Germany became one of a long struggle for freedom, bookended by popular uprisings. 
The political  impetus  to  incorporate  the  events  of  1953 into  the  national  collective 
memory of the reunified German nation seem unusually transparent. As one Associated 
Press report from the 2003 anniversary celebrations commented:
...historians and politicians are making the biggest attempt yet to pay tribute to the 1953 
protesters, instil pride about their cause and place it in line with other anti-communist 
uprisings like the 1968 Prague Spring in then-Czechoslovakia.4
The uprising in June 1953 has been introduced to the cannon of anti-communist protest 
entirely within the context of the revolution in autumn 1989. One example is given by 
Christian  Ostermann  who,  in  his  comprehensive  study  of  declassified  government 
sources, opined that 1953 'foreshadowed the deep crisis of legitimacy that would finally 
overtake the GDR'.5 Ostermann's  statement  is representative of historical scholarship 
linking the two events. 
4 Tony Czuczka, 'Germans seek place in history for 1953 East German revolt', Associated Press  
Worldstream, June 15 2003
5 Christian. F. Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953, (Central European University Press, 
Budapest and New York 2001). p. xv
42. A brief history of the unification, division, and 
reunification of Germany
After three short wars waged under the command of Otto von Bismark,  the German 
Empire  was  declared  at  Versailles  in  1871.  After  defeat  in  the  First  World  War, 
Germany  lost  territory  to  France,  Poland,  Denmark,  Czechoslovakia,  Belgium,  and 
Lithuania. In 1945 when the Second World War came to an end, Germany was occupied 
by France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In the east, 
Germany lost all territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers to Poland and the Soviet 
Union  and  up  to  14  million  Reichsdeutsche (German  nationals)  and  Volksdeutsche 
(ethnic Germans) were expelled from these territories and other countries. 
The German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) was established in October 
1949 in the zone of Germany that had been occupied by the Army of the Soviet Union 
since the defeat of Germany in 1945. The GDR was ruled by the Communist Socialist 
Unity Party (SED) which was formed in 1946 through the merger of the communist and 
socialist parties in the Soviet Zone of occupied Germany. The United States, the United 
Kingdom,  and France  had  merged  the  zones  which  they  occupied  into  the  Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) in May 1949. The FRG was a multi-
party  democracy  headed  from 1949  to  1963  by  Konrad  Adenauer  of  the  Christian 
Democratic Union.
From 1949 until 1969 the West German administration did everything within its power 
to isolate  the GDR. Under the Hallstein Doctrine,  any country that gave diplomatic 
recognition  to  East  Germany  (other  than  the  USSR) was  excluded  from diplomatic 
5relations with West Germany.6  In the mid-1960s, one FRG Foreign Ministry Official 
acknowledged; 'We judge almost every foreign event primarily from the standpoint of 
whether it increases or diminishes the isolation of the [East German] Zone'.7 In 1969 
Willy Brandt became Chancellor and initiated the policy of Ostpolitik which led to the 
conclusion of the Basic Treaty between East and West Germany in 1972. This treaty 
freed West Germany's allies from their dilemma over whether or not to recognise East 
Germany as part of the wider Entente.8 The two German states spent the next seventeen 
years under an official policy of 'peaceful coexistence'.9
After the overthrow of the SED government in East Germany and the removal of border 
restrictions in late 1989, German reunification officially took place on 3 October 1990, 
when the lands of the former GDR were incorporated into the Federal Republic. These 
events will be covered in much greater detail in later sections.
3. Theoretical framework
Before embarking on an investigation of the role of the 1953 uprisings and the 1989 
revolution  in  the  construction  of  German  national  identity,  it  is  first  necessary  to 
establish how I view national identity. In the tradition of Benedict Anderson and Ernst 
Gellner,  I  take  national  identity  and the  rise  of  the  nation  state  to  be  a  product  of 
modernity  and  therefore  constructed,  not  primordial.  Primordialists  believe  that 
6 William Glenn Gray, Germany's Cold War; The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany 1949 –  
1969, (The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill and London, 2003). p. 31
7 Ibid p. 3
8 Ekkehart Krippendorff & Volker Rittberger eds., German Political Studies Volume 4, The Foreign 
Policy of West Germany; Formation and Content, (Sage Publications London and Beverly Hills 
1980). p. 123
9 Matthew Stibbe, 'The Fischer Controversy over German War Aims in the First World War and Its 
Reception by East German Historians, 1961-1989', The Historical Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sep., 
2003), pp. 649-668. p. 660
6nationality is a 'natural' phenomenon and that nations have always existed as coherent, 
ethnically  demarcated  groups.  Although some theorists  such as  Anthony Smith  still 
espouse  a  kind  of  primoridalism  through  theories  such  as  ethno-symbolism, 
primordialism has been discredited by the majority of social scientists. This study will 
use the theories of those social scientists who have identified national identity with the 
emergence of large scale societies demanding mass participation.
3.1 Interpretivism and national identity
Taking  the  idea  of  constructed  identity  as  its  base,  this  study  of  post-reunification 
national identity in Germany will use an interpretivist  ontology.  Interpretivism is an 
ontology  based  on  a  constructionist  epistemology  which  holds  that  meaning  is 
constructed  by  humans  through  human  interaction  with  the  natural  world.10 
Constructionism  claims  that  nothing  has  an  innate  meaning,  but  that  each  thing  is 
imbued with meaning by humans who interact with them. The concept of 'nation' or the 
concept of 'German' are constructed through the lived experience of those interacting 
with these terms. But constructionism is an objective, not a subjective epistemology – it 
posits that meaning is not  created but  constructed with reference to the natural world 
and that meaning does 'exist', it just needs to be understood in context. Interpretivists 
claim that meaning is constructed by actors living in societies; and therefore meaning 
cannot be fixed but changes as societies change. Thus, meaning is always dependant on 
the historical and cultural context in which it is used.11. Interpretivism emerged in the 
nineteenth century as a criticism of the prevailing positivist ontology with philosophers 
such as William Dilthey, who identified meaning as the category that is peculiar to life 
10 Michael Crotty, ‘Interpretivism: for and against culture’ and ‘Interpretivism: the way of hermeneutics’ 
in his The Foundations of Social Research. (London: Sage 1998). p. 42
11 Ibid. p. 67
7and the historical world12, and Max Weber, often seen as the founder of interpretivism, 
who distinguished between the social science concern with  Verstehen (understanding) 
and natural scientific concern with Erklären (explanation).
It is no coincidence that interpretivist theory emerged during the great age of nation 
building.  Nationalist  histories  are  ideal  subjects  for  consideration  by  interpretivist 
historians. Interpretivism not only gives the historian tools to challenge the discourse of 
primordialism and immutability  which nation-building narratives  rely upon, but also 
allows the practitioner  to  recognise the interaction  between these narratives  and the 
nations which they are intended to shape. Thus, from an interpretivist standpoint, stating 
that meaning is constructed and alterable in no way implies that this meaning is not 
‘real’  and does  not  have  a  real  impact  on  the  functioning  of  society.  In  his  article 
‘Constructing  primordialism;  old  histories  for  new  nations’  Suny  discusses  the 
constructed  nature  of  nationalist  identity,  examining  the  process  by  which  national 
identity was constructed in Armenia and Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.13 This article clearly illustrates the impact of constructed identities on the life-
world of members of those societies.  In this article Suny demonstrates how the ethno-
nationalist  rhetoric  which  emerged  in  post-communist  Armenia  has  affected 
government policy, the economy and the ethnic make-up of the country. He contrasts 
this with neighbouring Kazakhstan which has attempted to construct a civic nationalism, 
and shows the tangible impacts of these policies on the two countries. If it is understood 
that  national  identities  are  constructed,  it  is  then  necessary  to  understand  why 
12 Hajo Holborn, 'Wilhelm Dilthey and the Critique of Historical Reason' Journal of the History of Ideas, 
Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan., 1950, pp. 93-118 p. 108
13 Ronald Grigor Suny, ‘Constructing primordialism: old histories for new nations’, Journal of Modern 
History, vol. 73, , 2001, pp. 862-896
8identification with a national group came about. Following a brief investigation of the 
origins of national identification, I will then look at the particular German case, and why 
German national identity still requires the writing of new histories to support identity.
3.2 The role of national historical narratives in the  
development of the modern nation
The development of the modern nation required that two essential conditions were met: 
the acceptance of the theory of popular sovereignty, and the development of a national 
consciousness.14 A national  consciousness required  that  the members  of  a  nation be 
aware that  they were members  of that  nation and that  they identified themselves  as 
members. These requirements necessitated the weakening of regional identities and the 
acceptance of national characteristics by huge swathes of the population. In order for 
this to be achieved, regional histories and mythologies needed to be incorporated into 
wider  national  narratives.  There  also  needed to  be  a  reason for  political  change as 
demand for national self-determination and the creation of national  states would not 
exist without an impetus for radical social upheaval.  The driver for the development of 
nationalism was the beginning of the modern, industrial era.15 Modern states have huge, 
far  reaching  infrastructure  that  require  the  support  and  loyalty  of  their  people;  this 
infrastructure developed in response to the challenges of industrialisation. For example, 
industrial  societies  required  transferable,  standardised  knowledge  to  be  available 
throughout the political and economic territory – this necessitated the development of 
standardised education systems.16 Standardised education systems allowed governments 
to train young people to identify themselves as members of a national society by raising 
14 Walker Connor, ‘When is a nation?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 13, no. 1, 1990 p. 211
15 Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996)
16 Ibid. p. 37
9them to believe the newly minted official history of their nation. Education standardised 
language and slowly eliminated diverse regional identities through either incorporating 
some aspects of regional culture, or through leading young people to identify with the 
dominant  groups.  The  process  of  national  education  made  these  new  nationalised 
societies seem ‘natural’ and ‘justified’ and led to a sense of inevitability which helped 
quash potential  challenges to the state.17 National consciousness which engendered a 
primordial  concept  of  the  state  was essential  to  this  process  because  it  allowed the 
population to feel a sense of continuity with the past at a time of huge social change. 
The early nation states of Western Europe, around which so much nationalism theory is 
based, clearly shaped their national identities to suit political needs. In these nations, the 
manipulation of identity was in the interest of the state which enhanced, shaped and 
protected ethnic identity.18 Yet it was vitally important for the population of each of 
these nations to understand their nation as a primordial, essential entity. The power of 
nationalism is in its ability to command ultimate loyalty from all members of the nation, 
and  for  this  loyalty  to  supplant  local  or  even  familial  loyalties  the  nation  must  be 
supreme and ancient. In his article ‘Constructing primordialism; old histories for new 
nations’ Suny defines nations as:
...those political communities made up of people who believe they share characteristics 
(perhaps  origins,  values,  historical  experiences,  language,  territory,  or  many  other 
elements) that give them the right to self determination...19
17 George Schöpflin, ‘Civil society, ethnicity and the state’ in his Nations, Identity, Power. (London: 
Hurst 2000) p. 41
18 Ibid. p. 41
19 Ronald Grigor Suny, ‘Constructing primordialism: old histories for new nations’, Journal of Modern 
History, vol. 73, , 2001, pp. 862-896, p.866
10
The idea of the nation as a primordial category was furthered by romantic thinkers such 
as Herder who asserted that the ‘proper foundation for a sense of political identity is not 
the acceptance of a common sovereign power, but the sharing of a common culture’.20 
The idea that national and political identity ought to be linked and based upon a shared 
culture is still seen as legitimate despite the cultural and ethnic diversification of many 
societies. Germany's quest to reforge a common culture in the aftermath of reunification 
must be seen in the context of the historic search for a German national culture, and the 
efforts of East and West Germany to develop separate identities from 1945 until 1989. 
4. The construction of a German national identity and 
the evolution of German historiography
4.1 How Germans told the story of their nation from 1871  
to 1989
The  first  histories  of  Germany  as  the  modern  nation  state  were  written  before  the 
Bismarkian unification to support the idea of 'Germaness' as a primordial category and 
to prepare the people for the advent of the nation-state. Berger asserts that 'Treitschke, 
Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann,  Max Duncker,  Johann Gustav Droysen and Heinrich 
von Sybel all wrote history not for history's sake but to allow the Germans to develop 
national identity'.21 The First World War did not lead to a widespread revision of ideas 
of the German national character as was seen after the Second World War – in fact, it 
strengthened the nationalist bent of historiography. The First World War was not seen 
by the German people or those who wrote their history as a German inspired war, and 
the guilt  placed on Germany at  Versailles  was therefore rejected and resented.  This 
20 F. M. Barnard, (ed.) J. G. Herder on Social and Political Culture. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1969).
21 Stefan Berger, 'Historians and Nation-Building in Germany after Reunification', Past & Present, No. 
148 (Aug., 1995), pp. 187-222  p. 188
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resentment  was exploited  by the national  socialists.  The extreme nationalism of  the 
National Socialist era allowed the myth of the 'dolchstoss' (stab in the back) to flourish 
and thus historians were able to maintain a triumphalist attitude to the history of the 
First World War.22 The 'dolchstoss' myth propagated the idea that Germany's defeat in 
the First World War was due to the German war effort being betrayed from within; an 
idea perceived tenable because no foreign troops set foot on German soil before the 
1918  armistice.  The  history  of  an  honourable  armistice  disrespected  by  the 
dishonourable allied powers held potent nationalist possibilities for the Nazi writing of 
history.23 German  history writing  can  be  seen  largely as  a  continuum 'imbued  with 
German triumphalism' from 1870 to 1945 with much in common with other European 
national histories of the era. However perhaps due to Germany's late unification as a 
nation-state the German academics traditionally had a close relationship with the state 
as they were self-consciously enrolled by the establishment to write a history to unify 
the emerging nation. In 1995 Berger commented that; 
British historians ... are often puzzled by the fact that their German colleagues feel a 
seemingly  irresistible  urge to  make  frequent  pronouncements  on public  debates  and 
issues and, what is more, command a good deal of attention for doing so.24 
This continuing relationship makes the study of German historical opinion vital to an 
understanding of the evolution of German national identity.
After 1945 German history inevitably took an extreme turn and was divided – as were 
the territory and the people – between competing ideologies on either side of a static 
22 Spencer Tucker, Laura Matysek Wood, Justin D. Murphy The European Powers in the First World  
War: an Encyclopedia, (Taylor & Francis 1996) p. 658
23 Lars-Broder Keil & Sven Felix Kellerhoff, Deutsche Legenden: vom "Dolchstoss" und anderen  
Mythen der Geschichte, (Ch. Links Verlag, 2002), p. 33
24 Stefan Berger, 'Historians and Nation-Building in Germany after Reunification', Past & Present, No. 
148 (Aug., 1995), pp. 187-222  p. 188
12
conflict. History writing from 1945 to 1989 developed largely separately, but it must be 
acknowledged that there was some impact  of one on the other as the two Germany 
states developed identities and historiographical traditions in tandem and opposition. 
East Germany portrayed itself as antifascist in nature due to its communist ideology and 
saw no relation between the East German state and the Nazi past.  According to the 
official  party  line,  the  promotion  of  communists  to  positions  of  power  in  the  East 
assured a break with the Nazi administration – in contrast with West Germany where 
many former Nazis were involved in the administration.25 Under National  Socialism 
communists had been persecuted so after the war years they saw themselves as natural 
heirs to the resistance.26 Indeed, in the years immediately following the Second World 
War the perceived antifascist  nature of communism attracted Germans to the Soviet 
Zone.27 There was a brief period in these early years in which the SED leadership called 
for 'cathartic shame and immediate embracing of socialist values' as the only means for 
the German nation to rebuild itself.28 But after the 1949 founding of the GDR the party 
resolved that there was no need for this 'misery history' and that the East German people 
ought to celebrate their position as the Sieger der Geschichte (victors of history) for 
having  emerged  triumphantly  from  capitalism  and  fascism.  In  her  2001  book 
Ambiguous Memory: the Nazi Past and German National Identity Kattago outlines the 
hegemonic narrative: 
25 Albrecht, Clemens, Die Intellektuelle Gründung der Bundesrepublik, (Campus Verlag, 1999) p. 568
26 Jeffrey. K. Olick, 'What does it Mean to Normalize the Past?: Official Memory in German Politics 
since 1989', pp. 259 - 288 in Jeffrey K. Olick, States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and  
Transformations in National Retrospection, (Duke University Press, 2003) p. 270
27 Andrew Beattie, Playing Politics with History: the Bundestag inquiries into East Germany, (Berghahn 
Books, 2008). p. 166
28 Siobhan Kattago, Ambiguous Memory: the Nazi Past and German National Identity, (Greenwood 
Publishing Group 2001) p. 84
13
In East German historiography, Hitler's appointment as chancellor on January 30, 1933, 
was viewed as a culmination of the historical process of monopoly capitalism and the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Fascism was interpreted as a phenomenon of the late 
phase of capitalism...29 
The primary relationship explored by East German historians therefore became not a 
relationship  with  the  Nazi  past,  but  with  the  wider  German  capitalist  past.  This 
relationship  developed  a  positive  Marxist  East  German  nationalist  tradition,  which 
Berger described as 'no less reliant on historical myths, albeit different ones from those 
dominant in West Germany.'30 The most important foundational myth in East German 
identity  was  undoubtedly  that  of  the  antifascist  nature  of  the  state.  The  communist 
regime legitimised itself though the creation of a dichotomy between capitalist  West 
Germany where former Nazis remained in positions of power, and East Germany which 
had purified itself of fascist elements. 
In  West  Germany  virulent  anti-communism  led  to  a  re-writing  of  the  story  of  the 
German  resistance,  beginning  immediately  after  the  war  as  the  West  German  state 
attempted to establish itself as the heir to Germany. In an effort to write the communist 
resistance out of the history of the Second World War, the attempted putsch against 
Hitler in 1944 became the centre piece of an attempt at absolution and expiation for the 
German elite. Berger states that this claim to a tradition of resistance was popularised to 
the extent that 'looking at academic historical text production in West Germany,  one 
could have been forgiven for assuming that only a conservative national opposition to 
29 Siobhan Kattago, Ambiguous Memory: the Nazi Past and German National Identity, (Greenwood 
Publishing Group 2001) . p. 87
30 Stefan Berger, 'A Return to the National Paradigm? National History Writing in Germany, Italy, 
France, and Britain from 1945 to the Present', The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 77, No. 3 
(September 2005), pp. 629-678 p. 637
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Hitler had existed.'31 Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s there was active resistance 
from historical  societies  to  the  publication  of  any  analysis  that  attempted  to  claim 
National Socialism as  the result of any German national or nationalist tradition. This 
changed with the publication of Fritz Fischer's 1961 analysis of the First World War 
Griff  nach der  Weltmacht:  Die  Kriegzielpolitik  des  kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914–
1918 in which he argued that there was continuity in Germany's foreign policy from 
1900 through to the Third Reich. Fischer's views challenged West German foundational 
narrative which asserted that 'Hitler had been an aberration in an otherwise respectable 
and proud national tradition'.32 John Moses later credited Fischer's work with changing 
the way West Germany engaged with its history; 
The  radically  improved  intellectual-political  climate  in  [West]  Germany,  in  which 
hysteria  over  reunification  has  dramatically  subsided  to  enable  a  new Ostpolitik,  is 
intimately bound up with the changes in historical consciousness brought about ... by 
the Fischer controversy.33
Although written in a traditionalist  political  history style,  the challenge presented to 
orthodoxy by the Fischer controversy marked the end of the hegemony of the post-war 
writers and the beginning of a more innovative and interrogative writing of history. This 
was the beginning of the  West German process of  'Vergangenheitsbewältigung'  – a 
process of 'dealing with', 'working through', or 'mastering' the past – which began in the 
1960s.  34 Fischer was not the only one calling for a more critical view of the German 
31 Stefan Berger, 'A Return to the National Paradigm? National History Writing in Germany, Italy, 
France, and Britain from 1945 to the Present', The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 77, No. 3 
(September 2005), pp. 629-678 p. 636
32 Matthew Stibbe, 'The Fischer Controversy over German War Aims in the First World War and Its 
Reception by East German Historians, 1961-1989', The Historical Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sep., 
2003), pp. 649-668 p. 636
33 Moses, John Anthony The Politics of Illusion the Fischer Controversy in German Historiography,  
(Barnes & Noble, London 1975) p. 130
34 Jeffrey. K. Olick, 'What does it Mean to Normalize the Past?: Official Memory in German Politics 
since 1989', pp. 259 - 288 in Jeffrey K. Olick, States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and  
Transformations in National Retrospection, (Duke University Press, 2003) p. 260
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past.  Olick  begins  his  1998  paper  on  official  memory  in  post-1989  Germany  by 
discussing a lecture given by Theodor Adorno in 1959;
According  to  his  diagnosis,the  Federal  Republic  was  more  concerned  with  getting 
beyond  the  past,  with  avoiding  difficult  memory  through  what  Adorno  calls  "an 
unconscious  and  not-so-unconscious  defense  against  guilt,"  than  with  the  genuine 
working  through  that  would  be  required  to  "break  its  spell."  The  ...  defensive 
unwillingness  in  the  Federal  Republic  to  confront  the  past-at  both the personal  and 
official  levels-indicated  not  the  persistence  of  fascist  tendencies  against  democracy 
(e.g., neo-Nazi groups) but of fascist tendencies within democracy. 
In the 1960s in West Germany the state was forced to deal with the Nazi past through 
events such as the Auschwitz Trials of 1963 - 1966, and the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 
Israel  in  1961.  It  was  a  time  of  generational  change,  and the  new generation  were 
willing to confront the past. Vergangenheitsbewältigung was a torturous process which 
required  a  fundamental  reconsideration  of  what  it  meant  to  be  German.  The  new 
generation of historians attacked the traditionally close relationship between German 
historians  and  state  nationalism;  this  era  marked  West  Germany's  break  with 
historiographical nationalism.35 After 1989 West Germans would contrast this painful, 
cathartic process with the state prescribed anti-fascism of East Germany, but at the time 
there  was  criticism from the  conservative  historical  establishment  who claimed  that 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung quickly  became  'not  a  self-critical  reexamination  of  the 
national  paradigm but rather a wide-reaching national apology'.36 This view, however, 
failed to dominate the historical discourse. Divorced, for the first time, from the service 
of building national narratives, West German historians looked to new forms of history 
35 Axel Schneider & Daniel Woolf, The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 5: Historical  
Writing Since 1945, (Oxford University Press 2001) p. 240
36 Edgar Wolfrum, in Stefan Berger, 'A Return to the National Paradigm? National History Writing in 
Germany, Italy, France, and Britain from 1945 to the Present', The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 
77, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 629-678 p. 637
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writing  –  histories  from  below,  women's  histories,  and  micro-histories  –  and  in 
eschewing  nationalist  history  they  focussed  on  pan-European  and  cosmopolitan 
concepts of identity.
Fischer's work also had an impact on East German historians and their relationship with 
the international historiographical community. Historians from East Germany saw little 
novelty in Fischer's ideas but welcomed his findings as 'a valuable contribution by a 
non-Marxist to the role of monopoly capitalists in the outbreak of war'.37 East German 
historians felt vindicated by this apparent agreement on the causes of war, and found 
that  for  the  first  time  since  the  1950s,  their  scholarship  began  to  be  recognised  in 
international  historical  debates.  In  the  1970s  'Ostpolitik';  the  recognition  of  East 
Germany,  and the resulting East German policy of 'peaceful coexistence'  led to both 
German  states  developing  separate  national  traditions  based  on  their  capitalist  and 
socialist ideologies.38 In 1967 the seventh party conference of the SED had declared the 
development of all sciences as its goal, and the historical sciences had seized the chance 
to  move  beyond  propaganda  exercises.39 The  GDR  continued  to  focus  on  writing 
national Marxist histories of Germany, but the 1970s also saw the broadening of the 
focus of GDR history writing and a shift to the study of national ideas and traditions 
which were not directly linked to socialism and or proving socialist ideas. Historians 
began to focus on classes other than the historical working classes and were able to 
rehabilitate and study historical figures previously denigrated by the party line. Long a 
37 Matthew Stibbe, 'The Fischer Controversy over German War Aims in the First World War and Its 
Reception by East German Historians, 1961-1989', The Historical Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sep., 
2003), pp. 649-668 p. 652
38 Ibid. p. 660
39 Axel Schneider & Daniel Woolf, The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 5: Historical  
Writing Since 1945, (Oxford University Press 2001) p. 237
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topic  of  study  in  West  Germany,  those  territories  formerly  dominated  by  ethnic 
Germans East of the Oder also became a new topic of GDR research.40
From the mid 1970s and into the 1980s, as many countries in Europe saw a renewed 
interest in national identities, politicians in West Germany 'called for a “normalisation” 
of the past'.41 This clearly demonstrates the symbiotic relationship in the FRG between 
social scientists and political powers. There was recognition of how strongly the public 
understanding and collective imaginings of the past influenced contemporary politics. 
There  was  also  institutional  recognition  of  the  social  reality  that  'constellations  of 
interests ...produce new images of the past, [and] new images of the past  ...allow new 
power  positions.'42 This  attempt  to  “normalise”  Germany's  Nazi  past  led  to  what  is 
known  as  the  'historikerstreit'  (the  historians  dispute)  of  1985  to  1986.  Brockman 
claimed that this 'seeming debate about the history of the German Reich was in fact 
about current West German politics.'43 And the conservative historian Michal Stürmer, 
advisor to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl seemed to concur with his statement 
that 'the future belongs to those who fill memory, coin concepts, and interpret the past'.44 
The  two  main  interlocutors  in  the  advent  of  the  historikerstreit  were  left  wing 
sociologist Jürgen Habermas and neoconservative historian Ernst Nolte.45 Nolte argued 
40 Axel Schneider & Daniel Woolf, The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 5: Historical  
Writing Since 1945, (Oxford University Press 2001) p. 236
41 Jeffrey. K. Olick, 'What does it Mean to Normalize the Past?: Official Memory in German Politics 
since 1989', pp. 259 - 288 in Jeffrey K. Olick, States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and  
Transformations in National Retrospection, (Duke University Press, 2003) p. 260
42 Ibid. p. 261
43 Stephen Brockmann, 'The Politics of German History', History and Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 
1990), pp. 179-189. p. 180
44 Jeffrey. K. Olick, 'What does it Mean to Normalize the Past?: Official Memory in German Politics 
since 1989', pp. 259 - 288 in Jeffrey K. Olick, States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and  
Transformations in National Retrospection, (Duke University Press, 2003), p. 261
45 Axel Schneider & Daniel Woolf, The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 5: Historical  
Writing Since 1945, (Oxford University Press 2001) p. 6
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that the history of the Nazi era was not being allowed to 'become history', that it was so 
present in every facet of German academic and social life that it could not be treated 
with academic objectivity.  He claimed that there were certain (unspecified)  interests 
keeping the Nazi past alive as a historical tool. Controversially, Nolte called for debate 
over whether Nazism had been a response to Bolshevism – imitating the latter in the 
level of 'mass murder, deportation, torture, and death camps with the only new element 
being...  the  “technical  process  of  gassing”.'46 For  the  National  Socialist  past  to  be 
normalised, Nolte argued, it needed to be possible for historians to interrogate it from 
every angle. This equation of communism and National Socialism during historikerstreit 
was to have repercussions in the later writing of German history after 1989. 
Interestingly, in the wake of the historikerstreit, the move by GDR historians to broaden 
their  study of  the  German  past  and culture  in  their  writing  of  an  SED-legitimising 
nationalist  history,  found  sympathy  among  those  in  West  Germany  who  were 
advocating a return to a positive national history which would not be 'forever in the 
shadow of Hitler'.47 The aforementioned Kohl advisor, Michal Stürmer recommended 
following the lead of the GDR when he wrote: '[t]he GDR can adapt Prussia’s history 
and national history for its needs, and we should take up this challenge productively'.48 
The  late  1980s  was  a  period  of  dialogue  between  the  historiographies  of  the  two 
German states. At a conference in March 1987 historians from the GDR and the FRG 
debated their interpretations of the German past. While this cooperation benefited both 
46 Stephen Brockmann, 'The Politics of German History', History and Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 
1990), pp. 179-189. p. 180-181
47 Full title; Knowlton, J. & Cates, T. (1993) Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of  
the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust Atlantic Highlands, 
NJ.
48 Stefan Berger, 'A Return to the National Paradigm? National History Writing in Germany, Italy, 
France, and Britain from 1945 to the Present', The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 77, No. 3 
(September 2005), pp. 629-678 p. 652
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sides,  it  also  threatened  the  historiographical  traditions  of  GDR  historians.49 The 
unexpected and speedy reunification of Germany saw GDR historical traditions become 
history  themselves;  relevant  only  for  their  impact  on  West  German  historiography. 
Schneider bemoaned the speedy obfuscation of East German learning and academics:
East German historiography did not survive the move to a unified Germany. After 1990 
the opportunity to undertake a comprehensive reform of all German universities was 
missed, and the West German system was introduced across East Germany.50
4.2 How history was written after the fall of the wall 1989  
- 2003
In 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany achieved what the Hallstein doctrine of 1956 
so brazenly pursued: the status of the sole representative of the German nation-state.51 
After this controversial pronouncement in his 1999 work on German integration, in a 
chapter entitled 'United Germany: West Germany Writ Large?', Bach goes on to explain 
why it was politically expedient for West Germany to appear to be quickly and quietly 
absorbing the former East. There was opposition to reunification on several fronts; from 
the  Soviet  Union  who  feared  it  could  compromise  their  security,  from Britain  and 
France  who  summoned  the  spectre  of  German  militarism,  and  from  the  European 
community who feared that West Germany would sacrifice its commitment to European 
integration for national unity. Only thus, according to Bach, would German unity avoid 
interfering with the path West Germany had chosen:
49 Axel Schneider & Daniel Woolf, The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 5: Historical  
Writing Since 1945, (Oxford University Press 2001) p. 238
50 Axel Schneider & Daniel Woolf, The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 5: Historical  
Writing Since 1945, (Oxford University Press 2001). p. 239
51 Jonathan P. G. Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration: German foreign policy and national  
identity after 1989, Freie Universität Berlin, Arbeitsstelle Transatlantische Aussen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik (Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
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To view united Germany as West Germany writ large maintains the continuity of the 
West  European  integration  narrative  of  progress  and  prosperity.  Postwar  West 
Germany, in the absence of a positive national identity, had largely made this narrative 
its own.52
This may not seem like a complicated or controversial  process.  The people of East 
Germany had clearly demonstrated their desire for change and the government elected 
in  free  and  fair  elections  in  the  GDR  had  voted  for  unity.  The  systems  that  had 
supported the East German state were unsustainable and maintained only through state 
terror in the form of the Stasi. East Germans, it was logical to conclude, had rejected 
East  Germany.  But  what  must  be  elucidated  is,  whether  they  believed  they  were 
rejecting it in favour of West Germany, or the idea of 'Germany' as a national concept. 
Officially, Germany was reunifying, coming back together. Reunification was no simple 
matter of political integration – even the terminology had potential pitfalls;  Germans 
had  to  seriously  contemplate  the  question  of  whether  'Germany  [was]  unifying  or 
reunifying?'  this  is  no question of trivial  semantics  as Olick elucidates:  'without  the 
sense of the nation naturally belonging together (and thus of  reunification), the whole 
enterprise might have seemed at risk.'53 
Politically and structurally,  the East  was to be incorporated  into the West.  The two 
states would become one by shedding the dysfunctional socialist system and applying 
the successful capitalist one. Culturally however, the country needed to believe that it 
was truly creating a unified identity. To do this, the legacy of the communist era needed 
52 Jonathan P. G. Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration: German foreign policy and national  
identity after 1989, Freie Universität Berlin, Arbeitsstelle Transatlantische Aussen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik (Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). p. 15
53 Jeffrey. K. Olick, 'What does it Mean to Normalize the Past?: Official Memory in German Politics 
since 1989', pp. 259 - 288 in Jeffrey K. Olick, States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and  
Transformations in National Retrospection, (Duke University Press, 2003), p. 268
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to be addressed and a new history needed to be written.  For the writing of the new 
history  of  the  unified  German  nation,  the  speedy  application  of  the  West  German 
tradition to the consideration of the GDR had important consequences. Olick explained 
the process thus:
Germany had a model for “mastering the past” (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), as it had 
come to be called. Collective memory – and mythology – about denazification was quite 
strong in West  German political  culture,  so the second “mastering of the past” was 
frequently brought into relation to the first. 54
West Germans felt that the pain of addressing the questions of guilt and complicity in 
Nazi crimes had been cathartic for the nation. In comparing the Nazi era to the GDR in 
the flourishing field of totalitarianism studies, there was an implicit expectation that the 
people of the former GDR ought to address their complicity in maintaining the SED 
state. However, there were discrepancies of distance, time-scale, and relativism; all of 
which have a strong impact on the development of identity. Let us deal with each of 
these issues separately. 
By  “distance”,  I  mean  distance  in  time,  perhaps  “detachment”  would  also  serve, 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung in West Germany began up to twenty years after the Nazi 
atrocities. As painful as the reopening of old wounds may have been, this process posed 
less of a threat to West German society than cauterising immediately after defeat would 
have. West Germany dealt with the Nazi past from a position of social stability,  and 
confidence, the same cannot be said for the position which the German people found 
themselves in when they began the  process of dealing with the history of the GDR. 
54 Jeffrey. K. Olick, 'What does it Mean to Normalize the Past?: Official Memory in German Politics 
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Next,  consider  differences  in time-scale;  the Nazi period lasted twelve years;  which 
means that it it was possible for even those who had been complicit with the Nazis to 
reconstruct their lives based on their pre-Nazi experiences after publicly performing the 
appropriate  penance.  The GDR was in  existence  for  forty years  and in  that  time it 
developed a sense of identity separate from that of the FRG – admittedly an identity 
based on the erroneous belief of its superior claim to anti-fascism and its supposedly 
superior  socialist  ideology – but the only identity that several  generations could lay 
claim to. Walter Schmidt, a former director of the history section of the East German 
Academy  of  Science  expressed  his  anguish  at  how  the  process  of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung undermined his identity and sense of self;
For  those  who  have  worked  in  the  GDR,  identity  will  not  be  created  by  blanket 
condemnation of the work and the achievement of more than forty years.  The GDR 
belongs to my identity. I cannot be understood without the hopes and disappointments,  
the achievements and failures, the expectations and disillusionment of this country.55
Finally, relativism, by which I mean the consequences of the comparison of the GDR to 
the Third Reich. The idea of comparing socialism to fascism was not new. Nolte, as we 
have seen, argued that fascism developed as a response to socialism; Siedler took the 
argument  further  and  used  the  theory  of  totalitarianism  to  favourably  compare  the 
National  Socialist  regime  to  the  SED,  he  asserted  that  the  Nazis  had  created  'an 
authoritarian regime, even if it included substantial criminal energy' but the communists 
had  built  'a  really  totalitarian  regime'.56 West  German  Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  had 
55 Quoted in Stefan Berger, 'Historians and Nation-Building in Germany after Reunification', Past & 
Present, No. 148 (Aug., 1995), pp. 187-222 p. 206
56 Quoted in Stefan Berger, 'Historians and Nation-Building in Germany after Reunification', Past & 
Present, No. 148 (Aug., 1995), pp. 187-222 p. 211
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equated the systems before 1989 by referring to 'communist concentration camps, and in 
a ceremony at Buchenwald in 1991 he referred not to the victims of National Socialism, 
but to 'all the victims of oppression.'57 Olick posits that the comparison between Nazi 
era Germany and the GDR was a 'potent normaliser' for Germany. If Nazism could be 
equated with Communism, then Germany became just one of many countries trying to 
deal with the legacy of its past and 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung ..., like the Nazi past, 
lost its specificity.'58 This could be the chance that conservative historians had looked 
for to 'normalise' the past, but it might come at the expense of a chance at creating a 
unified German identity. 
The process of dealing with the East German past began before reunification. One of the 
first acts of the freely elected East German government was to acknowledge guilt for the 
Nazi past and commit to reparations along the lines of those made by the FRG to Israel 
in the 1950s. This was a significant move as the GDR had always claimed that as a 
socialist state it bore no responsibility for the deeds of its capitalist-fascist predecessor.59 
Then, in 1992 and 1993, came the trials of the SED leadership which took place in West 
Germany,  under  West  German  law.  Before  the  trials  there  were  suggestions  and 
discussions of somehow submitting the former East German leaders to the East German 
people for trial, but this was judged to be impractical. As the first leader of the reunified 
Germany,  Kohl was anxious that these did not become political  trials  – and equally 
anxious that it did not appear as though West Germany mores were being imposed on 
57 Quoted in Jeffrey. K. Olick, 'What does it Mean to Normalize the Past?: Official Memory in German 
Politics since 1989', pp. 259 - 288 in Jeffrey K. Olick, States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and  
Transformations in National Retrospection, (Duke University Press, 2003), p. 269
58 Jeffrey. K. Olick, 'What does it Mean to Normalize the Past?: Official Memory in German Politics 
since 1989', pp. 259 - 288 in Jeffrey K. Olick, States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and  
Transformations in National Retrospection, (Duke University Press, 2003), p. 269
59 Ibid. 
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East Germany. The trials were thus carried out under the basic law of Germany and not 
under the exceptional conditions which applied to trials for Nazi war crimes. Presiding 
judge Josef Hoch, while upholding the charges against SED leaders such as Honecker 
for the killings at the Berlin wall argued that 'the court has to consider that fact that they 
are prisoners of German history like all of us.'60 Despite the best efforts of the legislators 
involved  and  support  from  the  citizens  of  the  former  GDR  for  the  former  SED 
leadership to be held accountable, there was still a sense that these trials represented 
'victors justice' and contributed to the continued cultural division in Germany.
Another step in addressing the continued sense of division, so that the way could be 
clear for the building of a unified German history freed from lingering bitterness over 
GDR complicity,  was an enquiry into the GDR by the unified German government. 
Originally, the Bundestag Enquires into East Germany were an East German initiative 
led by politicians concerned that the discourse about the GDR 'should not be reduced to 
scandalous revelations about the East German secret police and spy agency, the Stasi.'61 
Beattie writes that:
Everyone agreed that public deliberation of the past was necessary and that a 
parliamentary commission might participate in, foster and lead such deliberation 
(…). Considerable symbolic value attached to the simple fact that the Bundestag 
considered  the  East  German  past  worthy  of  its  continuing  attention,  which 
indicated  that  the  GDR's  legacy  was  a  national  and  not  just  and  eastern 
problem.62
60 Silke Arnold-de Simine, Memory traces: 1989 and the question of German cultural identity, (Peter 
Lang, 2005)
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It must be noted that although the inquiry was supposed to investigate the GDR in order 
to build a foundation for a unified identity, no quarter was given to those who wished to 
use the inquiry to reflect on the development of FRG identity. A demonstration of the 
failure  of  the  inquiry  to  investigate  West  Germany's  relationship  with  the 
fascist/communist  dichotomy  came  when  the  deputy  chairman  of  the  inquiry,  SPD 
representative Margot von Renesse dared to ask 'how denouncing someone as a fascist 
in the GDR differed from labelling someone a communist in the early years of the FRG' 
and her concerns were pointedly ignored.63
As well as investigating the practicalities of SED rule, the commission also committed a 
great deal of time to the methods by which the communist regime had achieved cultural 
legitimacy. This resulted in an attack on the myth of the innate anti-fascist nature of the 
SED state. The question on whether the prescribed anti-fascism in the GDR negated the 
anti-fascist  ideals  held  by  individuals  was  hotly  debated.  By  condemning  all  anti-
fascism in East Germany as instrumentalised by the SED, the anti-fascism of the GDR 
opposition parties who had emerged in the last stages of the GDR were also besmirched. 
The  opposition  parties  argued  that  simply  because  anti-fascism  was  official  party 
doctrine,  did  not  mean  that  anti-fascist  beliefs  were  any  less  genuinely  held  by 
individuals who grew up in the GDR system. As proof of this they defended the anti-
fascist ideals of the round-table draft constitution of 1990. The inference that the GDR 
had been antifascist only by decree from above, whereas the FGR had gone through a 
more tortured, complex, and authentic process of facing up to its Nazi demons, did not 
sit well with a people who had built their identity on the ideal of sacrifices in the name 
63 Andrew Beattie, Playing Politics with History: the Bundestag inquiries into East Germany, (Berghahn 
Books, 2008). p. 167
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of  anti-fascism.  The  belief  that  the  GDR had  suffered  more  in  the  post  war  years 
because of its refusal to allow teachers, doctors, lawyers, and many other professionals 
from holding positions because of their complicity with the Nazi regime was deeply 
held. It is an issue which has continued to incite the passion of citizens of the former 
GDR.64 As  the  euphoria  of  reunification  wore  off  and the  economy collapsed,  East 
Germans found themselves unable to reconcile their past with the German future.  In 
1997, in her work on the role of post-colonial  discourse on ideas of East and West 
identities,  Anke  Pinkert  described  the  continuing  contradiction  in  East  West 
relationships:
Although East and West Germany have been unified since 1990, complete social and 
psychological integration of the two German populations has still not taken place. Given 
the euphoria surrounding the reunification in 1990 (even now only 15% of the former 
East Germans regret the merger of the two German states), how should we understand 
the  relationship  between  East  and  West  Germans,  when  it  is  often  described  and 
constructed as hostile, bordering on hateful and oppressive?65
Ten years after reunification, there was bitterness in both the old and the new German 
states as the former West saw  the former East as the source of their economic decline 
and social problems, and those in the former East were disillusioned with the unfulfilled 
promises of capitalism. Commentaries began to emerge which rejected the new national 
story of triumphant unification brought about by a yearning for democracy and freedom 
on the part of the East German people. Let us contrast two narratives of reunification 
64 See articles such as; Bruni de la Motte, 'East Germany did face up to its Nazi past', The Guardian, 
Thursday 29 March 2007 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/mar/29/comment.secondworldwar [Accessed 26 May 
2011]
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from the first years of the twenty first century. First, Feiwel Kupferberg, the historian 
quoted in the introduction to this study:
What is interesting is that the national cultures of Nazi Germany and the GDR changed 
mainly because of the impact of outside forces. In the first case it was … the defeat of 
Nazi  Germany.  In  the  second  case,  the  obvious  superiority  of  the  West  German 
economy gradually eroded popular support for the regime which, until its collapse had 
survived mainly because of the antifascist credentials and accompanying mythologies of 
its communist leaders, who claimed to represent a better Germany.66
And then a more sympathetic treatment of the East German populace by economists 
Burda and Hunt from their 2001 analysis of the East German labour market:
It  is difficult  to find a more dramatic episode of economic dislocation in peacetime 
during the twentieth century than that associated with the reunification of Germany. It is 
a sad irony of history that the plucky East Germans who toppled the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in the bloodless revolution of 1989 were rewarded with an economic blood 
letting on such a vast scale.67
Although these two perspectives cast East Germany in drastically different roles – that 
of  the  economic  villain  versus  that  of  the  hapless  eternal  victim,  what  they  both 
illustrate  is  that  East  Germany  remained  'the  other'.  Integration  as  an  imagined 
community had not been a success. 
Meanwhile, a new kind of imagining was underway in the East. Finding themselves 
unable to join the imagined community of Germany, East Germans were looking for 
identity in an idealised imagining of the past. Ostalgie represented the failure of a whole 
66 Feiwel Kupferberg, The Rise and Fall of the German Democratic Republic, (Transaction Publishers, 
New Brunswick and London 2002). p. 6
67 Michael C. Burda & Jennifer Hunt, 'From Reunification to Economic Integration: Productivity and the 
Labor Market in Eastern Germany', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2001, No. 2 , pp. 1-
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German identity to supplant a deep seated Eastern identity.  As well as a longing for 
innocence it was a longing for belonging.68 As a discourse of West German colonialism 
began to emerge in the East, it became clear that a German identity must embrace some 
aspects  of  East  Germany.  But  what  events  in  East  German  history  could  serve  as 
symbolic identifiers? Any such event would have to be; peculiarly East German and not 
shared with the other nations of the former Soviet Bloc, attributable to the East German 
people and not to the SED rulers, recognisable and understandable to the people of West 
Germany. The 1989 revolution is obviously ideal, but 1989 had become a focal point for 
the bitterness of reunification disappointment. The 1953 uprising also fit the bill and had 
the added advantage of being relatively unknown in the West,  and the subject  of a 
blatant  SED misinformation  campaign in  the East.  By reviving interest  in  the 1953 
uprisings and linking them to the 1989 revolution in the collective conscious, historians 
and politicians could be seen to be interested in incorporating GDR history into the 
wider narrative of German history, could establish a tradition of democracy focussed 
dissidence  in East  Germany to replace  the discredited  anti-fascist  identity  base,  and 
could reinvigorate 1989 as the culmination of Germany's fight to exorcise its historical 
demons.
There are obvious parallels between the events of 1953 and 1989; both were popular 
movements which took place at a time of turmoil and change within the Eastern Bloc, 
both were in reaction to expected changes triggered by external events, both took place 
when relations between the Soviet leadership and the SED leaders were exceptionally 
strained, and both were indigenous movements largely unaided by external actors who 
68 Paul Cooke & Stuart Taberner, German Culture, Politics, and Literature into the Twenty-First  
Century: Beyond Normalization, (Camden House, 2006) p. 101
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had publicly called for the overthrow of the SED. In the sudden burst of literature about 
the 1953 uprisings which was published in 2003 for the 50 th anniversary of the events, 
there are frequent references to the 1989 revolution finishing the work which 1953 had 
begun. In many ways 1953 was the beginning of the East German state in that it was the 
impetus for the creation of the state security apparatus, the Stasi, and it was the point at 
which the Soviet Union were forced to commit to the survival of the GDR. The neat  
bookending of the GDR with anti-communist uprisings provides a strong framework for 
the construction of a victim identity. To test the viability of this construct, we must ask, 
how comparable are the events of 1989 to those of 1953? It is, as suggested by the title 
of Lämmel's 2003 work 'ein (un)möglicher Vergleich?'69 Before examining the viability 
of a comparison between the two events and the impact that such a comparison has had 
on the development of post reunification nationalism, I will briefly describe the events.
5. The Uprising of June 1953 and the Revolution of 1989
5.1 The uprising in 1953
The same day that Hitler committed suicide, Walter Ulbricht was flown from Moscow 
to Germany to help establish a communist  regime in Germany.  Ulbricht had been a 
communist party member since 1919, and as such, was elected to the Reichstag in 1928. 
He went in to exile when the Nazi party came to power, fought in the Spanish civil war,  
and then survived Stalin's purges of the German communist elite in Moscow.70 When 
the GDR was founded in 1949, Ulbricht was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and soon 
became the driving force in GDR politics. Despite the formal founding of the GDR, 
Soviet policy precluded full satellitization as a 'peoples' democracy' until 1952. In April 
69 Roy Lämmel, Der 17. Juni und der Herbst 1989 – ein (un)möglicher Vergleich?, (GRIN Verlag 2003)
70 Donald. S. Detwiler, Germany: a short history, (Southern Illinois University Press 1999) p. 211
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of that year Stalin demanded that the demarcation between East and West Germany, 
which until that point had remained relatively open, become a defended border. Stalin 
also sanctioned progress towards the socialization  of industry and agriculture  in  the 
GDR, but warned the SED to undertake reforms slowly.71 This last  piece of advice 
seems to have been ignored. In July 1952 the SED Party Convention announced the 
'Construction  of  Socialism'  and  began  a  programme  of  agricultural  collectivisation, 
prohibitive taxes against private trade and industry,  and persecution of the churches. 
Churches  were  singled  out  for  persecution;  especially  the  Protestant  Church  whose 
youth organisation was seen as a rival to the Communist Free German Youth. Business 
owners  and  their  children  were  no  longer  issued  ration  cards  and  were  forced  to 
purchase food at  elevated  prices  from state-run stores.  Farmers  who refused to  join 
production cooperatives were subject to prohibitive state delivery quotas, any farmer 
who failed to meet the quota was suspected of trading on the black market or being a 
'saboteur'.72 Despite the failure of the harvest in 1952, quotas were raised again in early 
1953. These measures led to severe food shortages and increasing numbers fleeing to 
the FRG:
In 1951, 165,648 East German refugees were registered in the West. In 1952 the figure 
rose to 182,393 of whom 52.6% were under 25. In 1953 the number leapt to 331,390.73 
The Construction of Socialism in the GDR was supported by the Soviet Union until the 
death of Stalin on the 5th of March 1953 sent shockwaves throughout the Soviet Union 
and led to a fierce power struggle within the new Soviet leadership. Childs states that 
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the new leadership 'displayed considerable flexibility in the foreign policy arena, raising 
hopes for a relaxation of cold war tensions' in order to 'give an impression of continued 
strength and unity'.74 This so called 'Peace Offensive' of the new leadership was at odds 
with Ulbricht's repressive programme,  and the Soviet  Council  of Ministers passed a 
resolution calling for many of Ulbricht’s  measures to be repealed.  The SED leaders 
were  called  to  Moscow  and  offered  aid  and  reparation  reductions  in  exchange  for 
accepting responsibility for the failures of the Construction of Socialism. On the 9 th of 
June 1953 the SED announced the 'New Course' which ended discrimination against 
farmers, craftsmen, the intelligentsia, and their children who had been penalised under 
the Construction of Socialism. The New Course also offered to restore property to those 
who had left the GDR illegally if they returned; withdrew price increases on consumer 
goods; and promised to stop pressuring teachers to proclaim their adherence to Marxist-
Leninism. A few days later, on the 14th of June, it was announced that 4000 political 
prisoners  would  be released  and a  further  1500 would be released  at  a  later  date.75 
However, crucially,  the New Course did not rescind the higher ‘norms’ for industrial 
output that had been imposed under the Construction of Socialism. These higher norms 
meant workers were expected to produce up to 10 percent more, for the same pay and 
under the same conditions. 
On  the  16th of  June  300  workers  from  Stalinallee  downed  their  tools  and  began 
demonstrating, demanding industrial output norms be lowered. They were soon joined 
by thousands of workers from other building sites and marched to the headquarters of 
the SED-controlled  trade unions.  No officials  would meet  the striking workers.  The 
74 David Childs, The GDR: Moscow’s German Ally, (George Allen & Unwin, 1983). p. 31
75 Ibid. p. 31
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following day, the 17th of June, there were strikes in over 270 locations in the GDR, 
involving between 300,000 and 372,000 workers.76 By 9:00 P.M. three Soviet divisions, 
comprised of some 600 tanks,  had restored order in the Soviet sector of Berlin  and 
closed  the  border  with  the  Western  sectors  of  Berlin.77 According  to  contemporary 
Soviet estimates, 209 people were 'killed and wounded' [sic] in the riots and 3,351 were 
detained.  In  the  note  prefacing  the  Situation  Report  dispatched  to  Moscow  which 
contains  these  statistics,  Ostermann  states  that  'research  now  indicates  at  least  125 
people were killed in the riots'.78 Seven demonstrators, from Berlin, Magdeburg, Jena, 
and Görlitz were sentenced to death and their execution reported to Moscow on the 18th 
of June.79 Protests continued in centres away from Berlin for several days. 
5.2 The revolution of 1989
It  is  not possible to describe the events which took place in East Germany in 1989 
without giving some background on the wider events in the Eastern Bloc at this time. 
After  coming  to  power  in  1985,  Soviet  leader  Mikhail  Gorbachev  introduced 
programmes of  perestroika (reform) and  glastnost  (openness, or transparency) which 
brought widespread changes not only within the Soviet Union, but in all the satellite 
states. perestroika fundamentally changed the relationship between the Kremlin and the 
satellites by giving these states more autonomy. Satellite states gradually came to realise 
that autonomy meant more freedom to set their own policies without fear of the Soviet 
76 David Childs, The GDR: Moscow’s German Ally, (George Allen & Unwin, 1983). p. 31.
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military intervening as they had in Prague in 1968 or Hungary in 1956,  and that they 
would not be able to rely on Soviet military intervention to support unpopular policies, 
as the SED had in 1953.  perestroika was a boon for reformers,  but posed danger to 
those repressive regimes which relied on the threat of Soviet force. East German leader 
Erich  Honecker was second only to Romanian dictator Ceausescu in his resistance to 
perestroika reforms.  When  the  Chinese  military  massacred  hundreds  of  civilians 
protesting in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, Honecker expressed his approval and 
chillingly proclaimed 'we took power in order to keep it forever'.80 But such was the 
integration of the eastern European Socialist states, that East Germany could not isolate 
itself; reforms in one country quickly impacted upon neighbouring states. On the second 
of  May  1989,  in  a  move  that  would  have  dramatic  consequences  for  the  GDR, 
Hungarian Prime Minister Nemeth informed Gorbachev that Hungary would dismantle 
the fortifications along its border with Austria.  Gorbachev  responded that the Soviet 
Union  was  also  planning  to  make  its  borders  'more  open'  tacitly  approving  the 
Hungarian plan.81 On the 17th of May 1989, East Germany held municipal elections and 
reported that the officially nominated candidates received 98.85% support.82 In the new 
era of  glastnost, and the Solidarity landslide in Poland, the East German people were 
outraged by this unrealistic and clearly fraudulent result. Thousands took to the streets 
to protest and despite swift police action, vowed to continue protesting every month.83 
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By July 1989, hundreds of East Germans had sought asylum in West German embassies 
in East Berlin, Prague and Budapest. When Hungary officially opened the border on the 
11th of September, tens of thousands of East Germans took the opportunity to flee to 
West Germany through Austria. That same month, peaceful demonstrations advocating 
reforms began in Leipzig. In early October, the SED regime banned visa free travel to 
Czechoslovakia, to stop the mass efflux of East Germans to the West Germany through 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
In  October  1989  Gorbachev  begrudgingly  attended  the  celebrations  of  the  40 th 
anniversary of the GDR. It was obvious at the demonstrations that the SED leaders were 
deeply  unpopular,  and  the  public  adulation  with  which  Gorbachev  was  received 
embarrassed  both  the  Soviet  leader  and  SED  officials.  While  in  East  Germany, 
Gorbachev made clear his dissatisfaction with Honecker and his disappointment at the 
SED failure to implement reforms. Without Soviet support, it was obvious to the East 
German Politburo  that  Honecker's  support  for a Chinese solution  was not a  tenable 
position for the party. 
A demonstration in Leipzig was planned for the 16th of October and soon-to-be leader 
Egon Krenz persuaded a 'very reluctant' Honecker to order forces in Leipzig not to use 
firearms under any circumstances and to act only to forestall violence.84 On the 18th of 
October it  was announced that  Honecker  had retired due to  ill  health  and had been 
succeeded by Krenz. However, Honecker's retirement was in reality far from voluntary. 
On the 17th of October at a weekly Politburo meeting, Prime Minister Stoph proposed 
Honecker be 'released from his function' and, unable to find support within the Politburo 
84 Donald. S. Detwiler, Germany: a short history, (Southern Illinois University Press 1999) p. 226
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for  his  continued  leadership,  Honecker  acquiesced.85 One  of  the  first  acts  of  the 
politburo under Krenz was an amnesty for those who had defected from the GDR – 
Republikflucht  (fleeing  from  the  Republic)  had  been  a  felony  and  those  who  left 
illegally were declared guilty in absentia.86 According to Detweiler, soon after taking 
over the leadership, Krenz learnt that the GDR was at the 'the point of bankruptcy' and 
'in order to meet current obligations... the standard of living would have to be reduced in 
1990 by 25 to 30 percent.'87 Krenz knew reforms had to be made but also that without 
substantial  foreign  aid,  the  country  was  in  no  position  to  make  such  reforms, 
considering the volatile social and political atmosphere. Krenz flew to Moscow at the 
beginning of November for a conference with Gorbachev, where it was made clear that 
Soviet troops could not be used to maintain SED control. On the 3rd of November Krenz 
appealed to the people of the GDR on television and radio, promising reforms of the 
court system and the military service requirement and asking citizens not to abandon the 
GDR, but to stay and trust the programme of reform. However, he emphasised that no 
restrictions would be placed on citizens who applied for the right to leave. This appeal 
was too little, too late; the next day half a million East German citizens protested in 
Berlin. On the 7th of November Stoph and his cabinet resigned and reform orientated 
communist, Dr Hans Modrow was appointed prime minister.  
The events of the 9th of November provided some of the most memorable images of the 
end of the cold war and need little introduction.  In a meeting held that day, Krenz and 
his colleagues decided to end the SED monopoly of power, to allow free elections and 
to  allow East  Germans  to  travel  more  freely.  An unclear  note  announcing the  new 
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regulations was handed to Berlin  party boss  Günther Schabowski during a televised 
press conference and he implied that travel restrictions would be removed immediately. 
Thousands of East Berliners travelled to the wall to test the announced travel freedoms 
and confused border guards let them pass. The most potent symbol of the Cold War 
division of Europe was destroyed.
Aftermath
On the 17th of  November  Modrow proposed that  East  Germany enter  a  'contractual 
community' with West Germany. When Krenz and all the members of the Politburo and 
the Central Committee resigned in December, Modrow became the head of government. 
Free elections which were held in East German on the 18th of May 1990 returned a 
President and Prime Minister from the East German branch of Helmut Kohl's Christian 
Democratic  Union  (CDU).  The  two  German  states  then  entered  into  an  agreement 
which established a monetary, economic and social union which came into effect on the 
1st of July 1990. A treaty for reunification was signed on the 31st of August and the two 
states officially unified on the 3rd of October 1990. The 3rd of October became a national 
holiday, known as the Tag der deutschen Einheit (Day of German Unity), and replaced 
the  holiday  previously  known  as  the  Tag  der  deutschen  Einheit  which  had  been 
celebrated on the 17th of June, commemorating the 1953 uprisings. 
6 Revolt versus revolution; a comparison between the 
1953 uprising and the 1989 revolution
As discussed earlier, every national identity needs symbols and myths to sustain itself. 
One concept that is often overlooked in the discussion of national  identifiers,  is the 
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constellation of these symbols and myths. Taken in isolation the 1953 uprising was a 
failure and was quickly forgotten. In the words of the German President Johannes Rau 
'Let's be honest: For one reason or another, June 17 had become a nuisance to many of 
us.'88 But when discussed in the context of later anti-communist uprisings such as the 
Hungarian revolution of 1956 or the Prague Spring of 1968, the 1953 uprising becomes 
the first in a line of heroic acts of resistance to communist rule. When discussed in the 
context of the 1989 revolution, the significance of the 1953 uprisings becomes more 
nuanced. Not only is it the first act of defiance towards a communist regime after 1945, 
but it is proof that people of East Germany would take advantage of the uncertain times 
to attempt to change their circumstances. By drawing parallels between 1953 and 1989, 
and showing the similarities between the circumstances it appears as though the people 
of East Germany spent almost forty years waiting for their chance to challenge the SED 
again. This is a powerful narrative for building a reunified national identity because it 
exonerates  the majority  those who lived in  East  Germany from complicity  with the 
regime. 
The next section will consider points of comparison between the uprising in June 1953 
and the revolution in autumn 1989 to test the veracity of the comparison of the historical 
contexts. Specifically it will address:
 the attitudes and actions of West Germany and its allies;
 the  relationship  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  SED  leadership  in  East 
Germany;
 the situation within the Eastern Bloc and issues facing the Soviet leadership;
88 Czuczka, Tony, 'Germans commemorate forgotten 1953 uprising, seeking east-west bond', Associated 
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 the economic situation of East Germany at the time of the unrest; and
 the make up and motives of the participants, and church and political groups 
involved.
6.1 West Germany and its allies
6.1.1 The attitude of West Germany and its allies to the 1953 uprising
In the aftermath of the 1953 uprising in East Germany the failure of the West German 
government  to  support  the  protesters  caused  disillusionment  in  the  GDR  and 
embarrassment in Bonn. Although unification was written into the foundational policy 
of the FRG, in reality it  had become less of a priority than the integration of West 
Germany into the European Defence Community (EDC) which was agreed to by the 
Bundestag on the 19th of March 1953. Although a sovereign state since 1949, the foreign 
affairs  of  the  FRG were still  heavily  influenced  by its  former  occupiers.  The close 
relationship  of  the  Adenauer  government  with  the Eisenhower  administration  in  the 
United  States  guided  the  West  German  response  to  the  uprising.  In  1953 the  only 
possible forum for discussions about the reunification of East and West Germany would 
have been at talks between the four powers who occupied Germany after World War II. 
The attitudes and policies of the FRG and her allies in the West towards East Germany 
were in turmoil after the death of Stalin on the 5th of March 1953. The new leadership in 
the  Soviet  Union  seemed  determined  to  establish  a  new  foreign  policy  based  on 
dialogue rather  than defensive paranoia.  The collective leadership launched a 'peace 
offensive' with Premier Malenkov announcing in mid March that there was 'no litigious 
or unsolved question which could not be settled  by peaceful  means on the basis  of 
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mutual  agreement  of  the  countries  concerned...  including  the  United  States  of 
America.'89 While it  led to progress on some fronts – most  notably the signing of a 
cease-fire in the Korean war, the peace offensive was met with scepticism. The Western 
Powers  had already shown themselves  resistant  to  re-litigating  the issue of  German 
reunification when Stalin had proposed a unified but neutral Germany in 1952. Stalin's 
proposal was interpreted by the United States as an attempt to stall West Germany's 
progress towards membership of the EDC – and it was feared that any discussion with 
the  new  Soviet  leadership  about  German  unification  could  have  the  same  effect. 
However, Winston Churchill was more optimistic about the possibilities of dealing with 
the new leaders and on the 11th of May 1953 he called for a four-party Great Power 
summit on the German problem. FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was alarmed by the 
prospect  of  such a  meeting,  and also that  Churchill's  proposal  could lead to France 
rescinding their ratification of the EDC treaty. As he was facing elections in September 
of that year, Adenauer could not afford to express public opposition to any possibility of 
unification, privately he expressed concerns and looked for US support in delaying such 
talks.90 When the Soviet tanks rolled in to East German cities on the afternoon on the 
17th of June any chance that the Soviets could earnestly propose a neutral Germany at 
four power talks was nullified. The events in June effectively put an end to reunification 
rhetoric  from  either  side  while  providing  the  Adenauer  government  with  an  ideal 
propaganda opportunity.
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Despite the open border between the sectors of Berlin and active intelligence links with 
the Eastern zones of the city, both West Germany and the United States were taken by 
surprise  by  the  uprisings.  That  they  were  not  involved  in  either  organisation  or 
orchestration is obvious from the initial belief by American intelligence agencies that 
the  protests  were  organised  by  the  SED,  a  Psychological  Strategy  Board  (PSB) 
memorandum from the 17th of June reported;
It  is  understood,  although  not  definitely  known  of  course,  that  the  Soviets  staged 
yesterday’s  demonstrations against  increased productivity quotas in order to react to 
them by cutting back quotas.91
The western powers soon accepted that the uprisings were spontaneous and genuine but 
when the CIA chief in Berlin proposed smuggling in weapons for the protesters, he was 
instructed to offer 'sympathy, asylum, but no arms.'92 Transcripts of National Security 
Council (NSC) show that in the United States there was some support for arming the 
protesters, but the President dismissed the idea as foolish stating that if the US were to 
'fan the flames of discontent' heads would roll and those 'heads would be the heads of 
our friends' and that 'while he wanted to cause the enemy every difficulty possible, he 
did  not  want  to  kill  our  friends.'93 During  these  meetings  Eisenhower  reiterated  the 
primacy of the integration of West Germany into the EDC stating that he would “do 
almost anything to help the German Chancellor [Adenauer]' and the goal of integration 
must not be compromised.94 Thus, despite Eisenhower's election platform of Soviet 'roll 
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back'  and Adenauer's  public  commitment  to  the  reunification  of  Germany,  Western 
response to the June uprisings was muted almost to the point of obfuscation. 
East Germany was quick to place blame on the West for instigating the uprising, using a 
speech made by West German MP Jakob Kaiser as evidence of a Western plot.95 On the 
23rd of June the SED issued a communique explaining that the entire uprising had been 
orchestrated by West Germany with American support.96 Although the historical record 
shows that this was clearly nonsense, West Germany found it politically expedient to 
downplay what little they and their allies had done to support the uprising. Narratives of 
the June events from West Germany fail to mention the role of RIAS (the Radio In the 
American Sector) in spreading the news of the strikes beyond Berlin, although there is 
little doubt that news of it could have spread any other way.97 Hutchinson shows that 
this involvement was, in fact, vital to the dissemination of news on the 16th of June:
...the  amazing  point  was that  it  was  known throughout  the  rest  of  the  country that  
evening, despite the fact that the Eastern radio stations made no reference whatsoever to 
the troubles. The responsibility for this lies chiefly with the West Berlin radio station 
RIAS...98
In his article  Volksaufstand und Herbst Revolution: Die Rolle der West-Medien 1953  
und 1989 im Vergleich, Hertle places more emphasis on the role played by RIAS from 
earlier in the development of the protests. He points to the RIAS broadcast on the 11 th of 
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96 Peter Hutchinson, 'History and Political Literature: The Interpretation of the "Day of German Unity" 
in the Literature of East and West' The Modern Language Review, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 
367-382. p. 370
97 Ibid. 371
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in the Literature of East and West' The Modern Language Review, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 
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June which interpreted the New Course as 'even by careful estimates, an extraordinary 
chance for the people [which] should not be allowed to pass by unused.'99 Allinson's 
assessment, on the other hand, is that;
[A] clear awareness of potential problems in the leadership of both the USSR 
and  the  GDR  almost  certainly,  if  subconsciously,  encouraged  a  sense  that 
active opposition to the SED’s hardline attempts during 1952-53 to construct 
socialism at any cost might bear some fruit in a period when communist rule 
seemed less secure.100 [my emphasis]
This seems a far less likely proposition than that put forward by Hertle; that the people 
of the GDR, encouraged by the popular RIAS broadcasts,  believed there was a real 
chance that reunification would be politically supported. 
The involvement of RIAS also led East Germans to expect some help from the West, 
and contributed to  the  disillusionment when none was forthcoming.  By omitting this 
small role from the official western narratives, West Germany was able maximise the 
popular foundations of what was, in reality, a blue-collar protest in which neither the 
East German intelligentsia or the farmers played a large role. An example of a West 
German statement  about  the uprising is  the following, which comes from a booklet 
published in English by the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs in 1953:
The Uprising in the Soviet zone proves that the resistance of the population against the 
despotic power of the SED is not broken despite years of systematic terror. The sole 
99 Hans-Hermann Hertle 'Volksaufstand und Herbst Revolution: Die Rolle der West-Medien 1953 und 
1989 im Vergleich' in Henrik Bispinck, Jürgen Danyel, Hans-Hermann Hertle, & Hermann Wentker, 
Aufstände im Ostblock. Zur Krisengeschichte des realen Sozialismus, (Ch. Links Verlag 2004) pp 163 
– 194 p. 167. Orignal quote: ...auch bei vorsichtiger Einschätzung eine ungewöhnliche Chance für die 
Bevölkerung. Sie darf nicht ungenutzt bleiben.
100 Mark Allinson, Politics and Popular Opinion in East Germany 1945 – 68, (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester and New York 2000). p. 53
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backing of the “Government of the Democratic German Republic” is the bayonets and 
tanks of Soviet troops. […] The people in the Soviet zone have shown themselves in 
this June uprising to be the best of democrats.101
On the 23rd of June 1953 when the SED published their communique blaming the West 
for the uprisings,  it  was clear  that there was no chance for reunification of the two 
German states, or of any reconciliation under the 'peace offensive'. With the threat to 
West  German  integration  into the  EDC annulled,  Adenauer  was able  to  declare  his 
unconditional commitment to the reunification. His statement of the 23rd reads:
We will not rest – this oath I take for the whole German nation – until the eighteen  
millions in the Soviet Zone again live in freedom, until all Germany is once more united 
in peace and freedom.102
Jakob Kaiser echoed this statement declaring:
Since the June uprising it has become clear to all that the German nation in thought and 
will has remained one whole. There are no two Germanies of which one is turned to 
freedom and the other infected with communism. There is only one, a Germany whose 
thoughts are of freedom!103
Building on such rhetoric, the West German government declared the 17th of June as a 
national  holiday somewhat  ironically  named the 'Tag der deutschen Einheit'  (day of 
German unity). In 1981 Hutchinson wrote that:
Although this day is no longer taken seriously in the Federal Republic, it was a decisive 
date in the fifties and early sixties, when countless speeches in schools and town halls 
101 Revolt in June. Documents and Reports on the People's Uprising in East Berlin and in the Soviet Zone 
of Germany. (Publ. by the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs). 
(Bonn: Bundes-Verl. [ca. 1953]). 64 S., Abb. quer-8° [Umschlagt.] p. 49
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throughout West Germany reinforced the view which had been quickly adopted in the  
days immediately after the uprising.104
In the late 1960s attitudes towards this anniversary became more ambivalent as German 
attitudes to reunification became less fervent – it became an embarrassing reminder of a 
missed opportunity – an opportunity that the West German people would have doubts 
about supporting should it come to present itself again. 
6.1.2 The attitude of West Germany and her allies to the 1989 
revolution
In 1989 West Germany was no longer a recovering country dependant on the political 
patronage  of  its  'great  power'  allies,  it  was  the  central  pillar  of  the  European 
Community.  The idea of  German unity had long been absent  from serious  political 
debate in West Germany and since the inception of Ostpolitik the two German states 
had normalised their relations. In terms of the media, the two German states had also 
grown closer together and each had a much greater understanding of the internal events 
of the other; Hertle wrote that long before there was a prospect of political unification, 
the people of Germany had already integrated as a 'television nation'.105 The role of the 
Western  media  in  1989  reflected  this  greater  integration.  From  the  time  that  East 
Germans started escaping en-masse through the 'Hungary hole' the West German media 
reported extensively on the arrivals. East German viewers could tune in every night and 
see jubilant images of East Germans crossing into West Germany and being provided 
104 Peter Hutchinson, 'History and Political Literature: The Interpretation of the "Day of German Unity" 
in the Literature of East and West' The Modern Language Review, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 
367-382. p. 371
105 Hans-Hermann Hertle 'Volksaufstand und Herbst Revolution: Die Rolle der West-Medien 1953 und 
1989 im Vergleich' in Henrik Bispinck, Jürgen Danyel, Hans-Hermann Hertle, & Hermann Wentker, 
Aufstände im Ostblock. Zur Krisengeschichte des realen Sozialismus, (Ch. Links Verlag 2004) pp 163 
– 194 p. 173. Original quote; Als ein staatclihe Einheit noch nicht zu denken war, waren die 
Deutschen als Fernsehnation schon zusammengewachsen.
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with  food,  shelter  and  'welcome  money'  in  the  same  way  that  West  Germany  had 
provided for those few who had risked escape from East Germany previously.106 When 
West Germany's resources became strained from the huge influx of refugees from the 
East,  Kohl  was  forced  to  publicly  request  that  East  German  citizens  stay  at  home. 
However, his pleas had little effect. The Western media reporting encouraged more East 
Germans to desert the GDR based on the welcome they expected in West Germany. 
Just as East Germans in 1989 had a much clearer idea of the potential and attitudes of 
their  capitalist  twin  state,  leaders  in  the  West  had  clear  ideas  of  the  position  and 
potential reactions of the Soviet Union in the unfolding crisis. Gorbachev had opened 
lines of communication to an unprecedented degree. He had committed to integrating 
the Eastern Bloc into Europe and with this goal in mind he consulted with Western 
leaders  over  the  future  of  Germany.  From  records  of  communications  between 
Gorbachev and the leaders of Germany, France and the United Kingdom, we can see 
how responses from the West Germany and the Western powers evolved throughout 
1989.
One figure towers over all others in the story of German Reunification – and that is the 
figure of Helmut Kohl, the last Chancellor of West Germany and the first Chancellor of 
the reunified  Germany.  Kohl's  political  memoir  is  entitled  Ich  wollte  Deutschland's  
Einheit  (I  wanted  Germany's  unity).  However,  the  role  that  West  Germany  played 
before the fall of the Berlin wall and the resignation of the SED politburo was minimal. 
The West German Chancellor had developed a working relationship with Gorbachev 
106 Richard A.Leiby, The Unification of Germany, 1989-1990; a Greenwood Press Guides to Historic  
Events of the Twentieth Century, (Greenwood Press 1999). p. 11.
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and the understanding between these two leaders was crucial to the peaceful transition. 
Before demonstrations in the GDR seemed to seriously threaten the SED leadership, 
Kohl  and Gorbachev developed an understanding that  West  Germany would not do 
anything  to  exacerbate  the  instability  which  was  beginning  to  manifest.  During 
Gorbachev's visit to West Germany in June 1989 he had frank discussions with Kohl 
about the situation in the  Eastern Bloc countries and the progress of reforms. Kohl re-
iterated  that  West  German  'policy  toward  the  socialist  countries,  toward  the  Soviet 
Union, ... [remained] on a clear course of non-interference in their internal affairs'.107 
However, non-interference no longer meant the isolation of the communist states; the 
two  leaders  also  discussed  West  German  financial  support  for  Poland,  of  which 
Gorbachev  approved.108 It  is  clear  from  the  records  of  these  conversations  that 
Gorbachev was pursuing his goal of European integration in earnest.  Gorbachev also 
had  assurances  that  other  Western  powers  would  not  interfere  with  reforms  in  the 
Eastern  Bloc.  Margaret  Thatcher  offered  assurances  on  this  score  when she  visited 
Moscow in late September 1989;
… we are in favour of those processes remaining strictly internal; we will not interfere 
in them and spur the decommunization of Eastern Europe. I can tell you this is also the  
position of the U.S. President.109 
However,  Thatcher  was  unambiguous  about  her  position  on  the  reunification  of 
Germany. She did not allow her conversation to be officially recorded, but in a report 
written  directly  after  the meeting  she  is  quoted 'We do not  want  the  unification  of 
107 'Document Number 67: Record of Third Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl' 
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109 'Document Number 85: Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher' 
in Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, & Vladislav Zubok (eds.), Masterpieces of history: the  
peaceful end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, 1989, (Central European University Press, 2010), pp. 
530 – 532. p. 532
47
Germany...such a development would undermine the stability of the entire international 
situation'.110
While Thatcher could speak for the United States on the issue of Western interference in 
the process of reforms in the Eastern Bloc in general, when it came to the reunification 
of Germany her position was drastically different from that of President Bush. As early 
as September 1989 Bush publicly supported the idea of German reunification. Alarmed 
that Bush might jeopardise the relationship with Gorbachev, his advisers recommended 
he speak of 'reconciliation' rather than 'reunification'. But the President was steadfast in 
his push for German unity and American support proved vital in the negotiations for 
reunification.  The  cause  of  German  reunification  had  captured  the  American 
imagination  ever  since  President  Kennedy's  famous  'Ich  bin  ein  Berliner'  speech  in 
1963.  Once  the  American  administration  decided  to  offer  it's  'uneingeschränkte' 
(unlimited)  support  to  unification,  the  political  balance  began  to  change  rapidly.111 
Almost  four decades  after  abandoning the 'rollback'  policy in  the wake of the 1953 
uprising, the concern for the United States was still the same – although committed to 
the cause of Germany unity, the United States administration was worried that a neutral 
Germany  would  leave  a  power  vacuum  in  the  centre  of  Europe.  The  Bush 
administration made it clear that they were not willing to sacrifice Germany NATO 
membership for German unity, but through clever dealing the two German states were 
quickly able to gain both unity and absorption Western Europe. A conversation between 
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President  Bush  and  Chancellor  Kohl  on  the  23rd of  October  1989  reveals  the 
commitment of both leaders to maintaining integrated Germany's membership in NATO 
and the Western European economic community. Kohl is recorded as having said;
[T]he media in New York, the coast, London, the Hague, and Paris […] holds that the 
Germans are now committed to Ostpolitik and discussions about reunification and that 
they are less interested in the EC and the West. This is absolute nonsense! […] Without  
a  strong  NATO,  without  the  necessary  developments  in  the  EC,  none  of  these 
developments in the Warsaw treaty would have occurred. […] Progress in disarmament 
and changes in the east are only possible if we stand together.112
In response President Bush expressed his belief in the West German commitment to the 
European community and urged
We are seeing a spate of stories about German reunification resulting in a neutralist  
Germany and a threat to Western security. We do not believe that. We are trying to react 
very cautiously to the change of leadership in the GDR.113
When the biggest of the demonstrations began taking place in Leipzig, the United States 
were still concerned that the Soviet Union might intervene militarily – an option which 
had not been unambiguously ruled out. Washington could simply not believe that the 
Soviet Union would let East Germany go without a fight.114 Until the day the wall fell, 
the USA were deeply concerned about the maintenance of authority in the GDR. While 
supporting  reunification  in  the  long  term,  the  USA definitely  favoured  a  slow and 
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orderly  transition  from two states  to  one.  Understanding  the  scepticism with which 
France  and Britain  viewed the  prospect  of  a  strong NATO-affiliated  Germany,  and 
concerned  that  if  Bonn  pushed  the  reunification  agenda  it  could  be  construed  as 
dangerous German nationalism, Bush took up the cause of persuading his NATO allies. 
On the  4th of  December  1989 at  the  NATO summit  in  Brussels,  Bush called  for  a 
reunified Germany to be given membership of NATO and integrated into the European 
Community. 
Standing in the way of German reunification were not only Britain and France, but also 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  380,000   Soviet  troops  who  were  still  stationed  in  East 
Germany. Bortfeldt believes that the French and British sceptics would not have been 
won over so easily, had Gorbachev and his foreign minister Schwardnadse not been so 
cooperative. Bortfeldt calls the negotiations for German reunification a “Sternstunde” 
(star hour) of the relationship between Germany and the USA; it does seem that with 
American support and Soviet pliability the stars were aligned for German reunification. 
American goals had not changed between 1953 and 1989, but in the 1950s the idea of 
unification was rejected because the Western powers were in no position to negotiate 
unification on terms which would be advantageous to them and detrimental to Soviet 
power. 
6.1.3 The comparison; what do the Western responses tell us?
The goals  of  the  Western  powers  remained  consistent  throughout  the  period  of  the 
GDR's existence – reunification was desirable but not at the expense of the stability and 
alliances of West Germany. The cautious responses from West Germany and its allies in 
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June  of  1953  and  in  the  autumn  of  1989  are  useful  for  the  implementation  of  an 
understanding of the events of 1953 and 1989 as bookends to the East German story. 
Revolt and revolution taking place without the encouragement of outside powers give 
agency and dignity to the actors – to the people of the GDR who took the the streets or 
left their homes and moved to the West in the hope of freedom. Had there been a more 
aggressive Western response to either of these popular movements, the narrative could 
not  be  one  of  a  valiant  struggle  for  freedom  against  the  odds.  No  matter  how 
disappointing it may have been to the East Germans at the time, the lacklustre response 
from the West gave their stories of struggle a heroism they would not otherwise have 
achieved.
6.2 The relationship between the Soviet Union and the  
SED leadership in East Germany
Ulbricht and Honecker dominated the politics of East Germany leading for almost the 
entire period of its forty year existence. During the tumultuous times of 1953 and 1989, 
both were deeply out of favour with the leadership of the Soviet Union because of their 
hard-line approach and their resistance to change. This next section will look at how the 
relationship of these uncompromising leaders contributed to the protests in the GDR.
6.2.1 Ulbricht and the Soviet leadership in 1953
The lack of confidence in Ulbricht by the new Soviet leadership in 1953 is evidenced by 
a  strange  series  of  articles  which  appeared  in  the  official  SED  newspaper  Neues 
Deutschland. On the 28th of May the SED had publicised the raised work norms which 
were to be enforced by the 30th of June. After Ulbricht's sojourn in Moscow, the GDR 
politburo was obliged to publish details of the New Course in Neues Deutschland on the 
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11th of June. Confusingly,  three days later, the paper carried an article criticising the 
introduction of the new norms and the lack of consultation  with workers over their 
introduction; this caused 'considerable surprise among workers, who interpreted it as an 
indication that the norms were to be rescinded'.115 Adding to the confusion was a 16 
June article in the official workers newspaper restating the norms and the deadline for 
their application. The Neues Deutschland article, it later emerged, was a Soviet attempt 
to  discredit  Ulbricht  and  the  16  June  article  was  written  at  his  behest.116 These 
contradictory  articles  caused  confusion  among  party  and  union  leaders.  Hutchinson 
believes that 'It was largely this state of confusion - and a justified lack of confidence in 
their  leadership  -  which  prompted  the  first  strikes.'117 The  Soviet  displeasure  with 
Ulbricht may have contributed directly to the uprising; but Ulbricht managed to turn his 
position of weakness into one of much-begrudged strength. 
After 1953, Soviet support for Ulbricht had led to the creation of one of the most hard-
line communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The East German government resisted de-
Stalinization  and  condemned  reforms  in  other  socialist  countries.  In  1956  Ulbricht 
avidly  supported  the  invasion  of  Hungary  and  in  1968  spoke  out  against  the 
Czechoslovak, reforms eventually banning the sale of Czechoslovakian newspapers. In 
1980 Honecker recognised Solidarity as a threat to communism and advocated a 1953-
style solution; implicitly invoking the idea of military intervention.118 When   Gorbachev 
began advocating glastnost and perestroika in the late 1980s, Honecker saw this as yet 
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another threat to socialism in the GDR. He banned the sale of Soviet publications in an 
attempt to isolate East Germany from the changing socialist community. 
6.2.2 Honecker and Gorbachev in 1989
Gorbachev's  frustration  with  Honecker  was  obvious.  In  a  conversation  with  West 
German  Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  in  June  1989,  Gorbachev  revealed  that  he  saw 
Honecker as a major obstacle to reform in East Germany.119 Then, while attending the 
celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the GDR, Gorbachev made a rare pronouncement 
on the internal issues of the GDR in a meeting with the East German Poliburo on the 7 th 
of  October  1989.  He warned against  resisting  reform,  arguing  that  perestroika was 
about 'the necessity of building not only a material but also a socio-spiritual atmosphere 
for the development  of society...  Life  itself  will  punish us if  we are late.'120 At this 
meeting Gorbachev also brazenly advocated the replacement of Honecker, by telling a 
story about leaders in the Ukrainian city of Donetsk who could not 'pull the cart any 
more, but we don't dare replace them... [while] the problems grow and become more 
painful'.121 Thus  the  rupture  between  Honecker  and  the  Soviet  leadership  was  well 
known in the SED. Despite his thinly veiled opinions on the course which the SED 
ought to take, Gorbachev reiterated that the Soviet Union would not intervene in East 
German affairs.122 
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6.2.3 Unpopular men and their role in the history of the protests
The  unpopularity  of  these  leaders  with  the  dominant  power  in  their  region  was 
significant to both the 1953 uprising and the 1989 revolution – and it is significant for 
the comparison of the two and their incorporation as a 'set' into the catalogue of nation-
building symbols. The confusion created by East Germany being ideologically isolated 
gave the protests and the protesters an autonomy that other anti-communist protests did 
not have.  This separates both the 1953 uprising and the 1989 revolution from other 
significant Cold War movements such as the 1956 Hungarian uprising or the Prague 
Spring of 1968. That the East German protests took place outside the auspices of the 
ruling party is significant for their usefulness as symbols for a unified Germany. Had 
these  events  been in  support  of  reforms instigated  by the  SED, as  was  the  case  in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary,  there would be little relevance for them in the symbol 
lexicon of a Germany unified against the background of SED tyranny. 
It is easy to draw a parallel between Ulbricht and Honecker who between them led East 
Germany for all but a few weeks of its existence. They were both hard-line leaders who 
fell  out  of  favour  with  Moscow because  of  their  resistance  to  reform;  yet  one was 
supported with tanks and the other was quietly deposed. To understand this difference 
we will now investigate what had changed in the relationship between East Germany 
and the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1989.
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6.3 The situation within the Eastern Bloc
6.3.1 Issues facing the Soviet leadership in 1953 
Ostermann,  one  of  the  leading  authorities  on  the  1953  uprising,  states  that  Soviet 
support for Ulbricht was far from inevitable, and remains inexplicable: 'On the height of 
the crisis in East Berlin, for reasons that are not yet entirely clear, the Soviet leadership 
committed itself to the political survival of Ulbricht and his East German state.'123 In 
order to understand the similarities  and differences  between the events of 1953 and 
1989, it is vital that we further investigate the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and the contemporaneous GDR leaders. The most important aspect of this relationship 
was not the GDR leaders themselves, but the situation in the Soviet Union. The fact that 
the uprisings came so soon after the death of Stalin was perhaps the most important 
contributing  factor  in  the  Soviet  decision  to  commit  to  what  seemed  like  a  drastic 
change  in  direction.  Before  1953  Soviet  consensus  appears  to  have  been  moving 
towards complete  withdrawal from Germany.  Historians are divided on whether this 
policy, as set out in the Stalin note, was serious or just a tactic to stall the integration of 
FRG into the Western Bloc; but recently released documents show that this policy was 
being seriously considered. Whether or not the Stalin note of 1952 was to be taken 
seriously, and how four party talks on the the subject of Germany would have played 
out can never be known, but while the leadership in the Soviet Union was unstable, so 
was its policy towards Germany. 
Stalin's  death  in  1953  brought  a  great  opportunity  for  change  –  just  as  the  1985 
accession of Gorbachev would, after the deaths of a succession of old and out of touch 
123 Christian F. Ostermann, '“This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse”: The Post-Stalin Succession 
Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and 
Hungarian Archives' Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 10 (Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. March 1998) pp. 61 – 110. p. 61
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communist  leaders. Beginning with calls for change at Stalin's funeral, the politburo 
elite, led by the troika of Beria, Malenkov, and Molotov, lost no time in implementing 
new  policies  both  within  the  Soviet  Union  and  in  the  satellite  states.  Unrest  and 
instability in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary after Stalin's death led 
the new leadership to develop the New Course which made radical changes to Stalinist 
policies. The satellite states were given no choice about how and when the reforms were 
to be implemented. The new leadership had no qualms about demoting the Hungarian 
Stalinist leader  Rákosi when he 'embraced the New Course less enthusiastically than 
expected'.124 It  seems likely that  if  the issue of German unification had not  become 
caught up in the power struggle in the Soviet politburo, the same treatment might have 
been in store for Ulbricht; considering the media campaign to discredit him it seems 
plans for his downfall were already in place. Fortunately for Ulbricht, and unfortunately 
for the cause of German reunification, former Secret Police chief Beria had become the 
champion of the Stalin note solution. He advocated German unity as a neutral, capitalist 
state. Beria's brutality in his previous career had made him unpopular and his ambition 
was feared by the other members of the politburo. In late June 1953 Khrushchev led a 
campaign to have him tried and executed. Beria's downfall meant that measures which 
had received his support were blacklisted along with him – and the two-state German 
solution  became official  policy  for  almost  four  decades.  Of  course,  considering  the 
attitudes of West Germany and her allies, and all the other facets of the situation in 
Germany,  there  is  no  way  of  knowing  how  crucial  Beria's  downfall  was  to  the 
abandonment of unification discussions, but had the uprising in East Germany come at a 
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time of stability in the leadership of the Soviet Union, it is likely that it would have had 
very different consequences for the East German leadership.
The speed at which the Soviet Union demanded the reforms of 1953 be implemented 
also  had  a  dramatic  effect  on  their  reception  by  the  German  populace.  Ulbricht, 
Grotewohl and Oelssner were summoned to Moscow and arrived on the 2nd of June. 
They returned to Berlin on the 6th of June with orders to announce the New Course 
immediately.  In  his  work  The East  German Leadership 1946 – 1973; Conflict  and  
Crisis, Grieder reports that the new policies were to prepare the GDR to become part of 
a 'united democratic and peace-loving Germany'  and that the policies were met with 
enthusiasm from some members of the Volkskammer, but with dismay by those close to 
Ulbricht.125 However,  even  those  who  supported  the  measures  were  worried  about 
announcing them so soon after  the cessation  of  propaganda for  the Construction  of 
Socialism.  When  SED  Politburo  member  Herrnstadt  pleaded  with  the  Soviet 
representative in Berlin for two weeks to prepare the people for the drastic changes 
which the New Course entailed, he was rebuffed and ordered to publish the policies. 
Just  as  Herrnstadt  had  feared,  the  dramatic  announcement  was  seen  as  SED back-
pedalling  and  misinterpreted  by  the  populace  as  evidence  of  Western,  not  Eastern, 
pressure.  Ostermann  quotes  an  internal  SED  document  which  stated  that  “broad 
segments of the population did … not understand the Party's New Course, viewed it as a 
sign of weakness or even as a victory by the Americans or the Church.' and a local SED 
account from Seehausen which reported that 'the entire village is in the bar drinking to 
125 Peter Grieder, The East German Leadership 1946 – 1973; Conflict and Crisis, (Manchester University 
Press; Manchester and New York, 1999)
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the health of Adenauer.'126 It is clear how the pace of Soviet reforms, driven by events 
within the Soviet Union, contributed to the uprisings in June 1953. As discussed in the 
section  on  the  involvement  of  West  Germany  and  her  allies,  RIAS  were  able  to 
capitalise on the confusion and encourage the East Germans to push for greater reform. 
The support for Ulbricht subsequent to the uprisings may be partly explained in the 
short term through the Soviet leadership's desire not to appear as though they had bowed 
to popular pressure to depose him,  and in the long term through the blacklisting of 
Beria's plans.
6.3.2 Issues facing the Soviet leadership in 1989 
1989 was also a time of great change, when the people of East Germany, encouraged by 
the  news  of  reforms,  demanded  more  radical  changes  than  their  government  were 
prepared to make. But there were a number of important differences in the impetus and 
sources  of  reform,  the relationship  between the  Soviet  Union and the East  German 
leadership and the situation within the Soviet Union. In 1989, Gorbachev had been in 
power for four years and had been implementing his reforms for almost as long. As in 
1953,  these  reforms  were  in  part  a  solution  to  unrest  in  the  satellite  states  –  to 
accommodate, for example, the Solidarity movement in Poland – but these reforms were 
also the cause of unrest in East-Central Europe as Gorbachev left it up to individual 
states to implement reforms (or not to, in the case of Romania, the Czech Republic and 
the GDR). So one way in which we can see that the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and the GDR had changed from 1953 to 1989 was in the level of autonomy that 
the SED had from the Soviet leadership. In 1953 reforms were foisted onto an unwilling 
126 Christian. F. Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953, (Central European University Press, 
Budapest and New York 2001). p. 20
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Ulbricht  who had no choice but  to  implement  those reforms in the time frame and 
manner  dictated  to  him by Moscow,  and the  clumsy  and confusing  manner  of  the 
implementation fed directly into the unrest. In 1989, the people of East Germany had a 
much  clearer  idea  of  what  reform  could  achieve  because  they  had  seen  the 
developments in Poland and Hungary. 
The key difference in the outcome of the 1989 revolution was due to Gorbachev and his 
determination to eschew military intervention on behalf of any of the regimes in the 
socialist satellite states. Gorbachev spent a great deal of time encouraging the dramatic 
changes  that  he  hoped  would  prevent  violent  uprisings.  Gorbachev  was  a  new 
generation of Soviet leader and came to power after the deaths in office of three Soviet 
leaders.  The  first  Soviet  leaders  born  after  the  1917  revolution,  Gorbachev  was  a 
committed communist, but the extensive overseas travel that his high standing within 
the  party  allowed  him  had  caused  him  to  question  the  superiority  of  the  'social 
democratic'  system.  When  Gorbachev  was  called  to  Moscow  by  Brezhnev  and 
appointed to the Politburo in 1978, he was around 25 years younger than his average 
colleague.127 US  President  Ronald  Reagan,  who  was  virulently  anti-communist  and 
perceived the Soviet Union as a clear and present danger at the time of his election, was 
impressed by the Gorbachev's energy and passion for change. Regan, who had seen 
three Soviet leaders pass away, described his relationship with Gorbachev as 'something 
very close to a friendship' and recalled;
[H]e  was  different  from the  Communists  who  had  preceded him to  the  top  of  the 
Kremlin hierarchy....  [H]e was the first  not to push Soviet expansionism, the first  to 
127 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War,  
(Hill and Wang, New York 2007) pp. 366 – 371. 
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agree to destroy nuclear weapons, the first to suggest a free market and to support open 
elections and freedom of expression.128
Perhaps the most significant difference between Gorbachev and his predecessors was 
that he saw the biggest threat to the Soviet Union not as external attack, but internal 
disintegration. He did not set about his programmes of reform with the aim of breaking 
the hold of communism on the Eastern Bloc, but as reforms developed he did nothing to 
stop them. He did not have the inclination to support hard-line regimes by force and he 
knew that  even if  he  did,  he  would  not  have  the  means  to  maintain  such support. 
Gorbachev knew that there was no way the Soviet Union would be able to keep up in an 
arms  race  with  the  United  States  who  he  thought  were  simply  'waiting  for  us  to 
drown'.129 Gorbachev's determination that his country would not be intimidated led to an 
unprecedented level of contact and bargaining, and ultimately to the end of the Breznev 
doctrine. 
The leadership of the Soviet Union had an impact on the development of the uprising 
and  the  revolution  as  Gorbachev's  openness  inspired  the  masses  to  revolt,  and  the 
confusion  created  by  Moscow's  indecision  fomented  unrest.  It  also  had  an  obvious 
impact on the outcomes. However, the impact on our interpretation is dependant on the 
next subject of investigation – the economic situation of the GDR and the Soviet Union. 
128 Barbara Farnham 'Reagan and the Gorbachev Revolution: Perceiving the End of Threat', Political  
Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 225-252. p. 240
129 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War,  
(Hill and Wang, New York 2007) p. 375
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6.4 All about the money; the impact of economics
6.4.1 The economic situation of East Germany in 1953
When Germany was divided among the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and 
the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, each occupying power had the 
right to extract reparations from within their zone (although according to the Potsdamm 
agreement some reparations were also to be paid from other zones). Reparations exacted 
by the Soviet occupiers were in the form of the dismantling or sequestering of factories, 
railway lines and many other industrial installations.130 This significantly diminished the 
economic capacity of the Soviet Zone which already had the disadvantage of being a 
poorer area and importer of raw materials before the war. In the autumn of 1947 the 
SED began planning a Soviet style economy. The massive impending inflation caused 
by the Nazi issuing of notes to finance the war meant that currency reforms were vital,  
the reforms designed by the SED under Soviet leadership favoured state institutions and 
concentrated  resources  in  their  hands.131 But  plan  for  the  institution  of  a  planned 
economy were thwarted by constant Soviet shifts in their demands for reparations, the 
inefficiencies in SED attempts to placate workers by reintroducing piecework wages at 
the  same  time  as  fixing  targets,  and  the  institution  of  quotas  for  agriculture  with 
concessions for the free sale of surplus crops which warped market prices. The SED 
concentrated its funds on the heavy industrial sectors which led to other sectors being 
unable  to  maintain  their  capacity.  Into  this  inefficient  situation  came  the  1952 
Construction of Socialism intended to speed up collectivisation and the nationalisation 
of private trade and industry. The Construction of Socialism quickly wreaked further 
havoc  on  an  economy  already  hard  hit  by  the  mass  migration  of  skilled  and  able 
130 Mark Allinson, Politics and Popular Opinion in East Germany 1945 – 68, (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester and New York 2000). p
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workers.  The forced collectivisation  of  agriculture  combined with the failure  of  the 
harvest led to huge food shortages and the unmaintained infrastructure led to power and 
heating  outages  which  caused  suffering  in  the  population  and  further  problems  for 
industry.132
By the end of 1952, the East German economy was near collapse and Ulbricht appealed 
to  the  Soviet  Union  for  aid  in  both  currency  and  raw materials.  His  appeals  went 
unanswered and  repeated appeals in March and April of 1953 were met with refusal 
and advice to adopt a gentler approach. Ulbricht ignored this advice and on the 9th of 
May issued and order for ration cards to be withdrawn from a further two million East  
Germans who had not fallen in line with the Construction of Socialism measures.133 
Grider claims that by early 1953 'the GDR was approaching a state of civil  war'  as 
fifteen to twenty thousand people fled every month and Ulbricht pushed through his 
social  and  economic  reforms.134 When  a  delegation  of  SED officials  was  called  to 
Moscow in June 1953 the GDR was in what Grieder terms an 'existential crisis'. 
The  Soviet  Union  had  become  increasingly  alarmed  by  the  refugee  crisis  in  East 
Germany and the unpopularity of the SED and its harsh measures. A memorandum from 
key members of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in April 1953 outlines radical changes to 
the relationship between the Soviet Union and the GDR which, it was hoped, might 
alleviate tensions within the state and prepare the GDR for existence within a unified, 
neutral Germany. These involved the transfer of 33 industrial enterprises held by the 
132 Christian. F. Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953, (Central European University Press, 
Budapest and New York 2001). p. 3
133 Peter Grieder, The East German Leadership 1946 – 1973; Conflict and Crisis, (Manchester University 
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Soviet Union to the government of the GDR, the promise of scientific and technical 
assistance  and the implementation  of  the  policies  which were  involved in  the 'New 
Course'.135 A  short  time  later  more  financial  concession  such  as  the  halving  of 
reparations, and compensation 'on favourable terms' to the SED government for Soviet 
enterprise on GDR territory were recommended.136 When Ulbricht and his comrades 
arrived  in  Moscow  they  found  they  were  offered  this  aid  in  return  for  taking 
responsibility  for  the  failure  of  the  Construction  of  Socialism  plan,  and  the 
implementation  of  the  Soviet-directed  New  Course.  The  confusion  created  by  the 
speedy implementation of the New Course and Ulbricht's failure to publicly admit the 
failings  of  the  previous  programme,  and the  role  this  confusion  played  in  the  June 
uprising have already been discussed. The important factor to note is that the Soviet 
Union had taken drastic steps to fiscally support the GDR in its time of crisis and would 
continue to do so for many subsequent years. When the protests began on the 15 th and 
16th of June they were industrial protests against raised work norms – financially rather 
than socially motivated protests – and had the Soviet New Course been carried out to 
the letter, the raised work norms would have been lowered. However, after the SED 
failed to  immediately capitulate  the protests  offered the frustrated  population of  the 
GDR a chance to show their antipathy to the regime that had pushed them into such 
severe circumstances. The dire economic conditions in the GDR in 1953 and the rapid 
decline of the preceding years were a vital precipitating factor in the 1953 uprisings. 
135 'Document Number 6: Memorandum on the German Question, from Georgii Pushkin and Mikhail 
Gribanov to Vyacheslav Molotov, 18 April 1953', in Christian. F. Ostermann, Uprising in East  
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The new leadership in the Soviet Union had attempted, too late, to pull the GDR back 
from the brink of collapse.
6.4.2 The economic situation of East Germany in 1989
Leffler described the financial situation of the GDR in 1989 as 'ghastly' and indeed the 
ensuing financial impact of the reunification of East and West Germany has frequently 
been described in such terms. In one of his first undertakings as leader, Krenz ordered a 
thorough review of  East  Germany's  financial  situation  –  a  process  which  had  been 
proscribed  by  Honecker.  As  mentioned  earlier,  he  discovered  that  the  current 
obligations of the GDR were of such magnitude,  that in order to meet them without 
increasing foreign debt, the standard of living in East Germany would have to drop by 
between 25 and 30 percent.137 Leffler  estimates  that  '[b]y the  end of  1989 the  East 
German government would owe $26.5 billion to the West; its current annual payments 
deficit  was  more  that  $12 billion.'138 Gobachev was reportedly  'taken aback'  by the 
enormity of the financial problems of what had been one of the strongest economies in 
the Eastern Bloc. It seems that the parlous state of the economy was indeed little known. 
As recently as February 1989 a report produced by the CPSU international department 
had concluded that 'the GDR can be distinguished from other socialist countries by the 
better state of its economy and standard of living'.139 That the Soviet leadership did not 
know the levels of East German debt, and that such an amount was owed to capitalist 
creditors, show how far the Eastern Bloc had decentralised since the mass refusal of the 
137 Donald. S. Detwiler, Germany: a short history, (Southern Illinois University Press 1999) p. 227
138 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War,  
(Hill and Wang, New York 2007) p. 433
139 'Document Number 41: Memorandum from CC CPSU International Department, “On a Strategy for 
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64
Marshall plan. Gorbachev counselled Krenz to seek financial aide from West Germany 
but  to  be  'wary  of  making  too  many  concessions'.140 In  conversation  with  Krenz 
Gorbachev seemed less shocked than commentators have described. In a record of a 
conversation with Krenz on the 1st of  December  1989 Gorbachev stated;  'We knew 
about  your  situation,  about  your  economic  and financial  ties  with  the FRG and we 
understood how it could all turn out.'141 
In  this  same conversation,  Gorbachev  touched on the  financial  problems facing  the 
Soviet Union, comparing Krenz's shock at discovering the indebtedness of the GDR to 
his own upon first enquiring after the Soviet budget;
Some time ago when I was already a politburo member, I basically did not know our 
budget. Once when we were working... on some request of Andropov's that had to do 
about budgetary issues we naturally decided that we should learn about them. But Yuri 
V Andropov said: Do not go there, it is not your business. Now we know why he said 
so. It was not a budget, but the devil knows what.
The autonomy which Gorbachev had awarded to the Soviet satellite states in Eastern 
Europe and his unwillingness to prop up unpopular regimes were undoubtedly laudable 
moves towards a more democratic future, but they must be seen in the pragmatic light of 
the economic situation of the Soviet Union. Since the 1970s the Soviet Union had been 
propping up the economies of their sphere of influence by providing gas and oil at lower 
than  world  market  levels.142 But  when  prices  dropped  four-fold  in  1986 the  Soviet 
140 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War,  
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leadership came to realise that the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 
the Eastern Bloc trading organisation) was unsustainable. In 1988 Gorbachev made it 
clear that the people of the Soviet Union were his first priority, even if if this meant  
being tougher in dealings with members of the CMEA and accepting broad contacts 
with the West.143 Unlike in 1953 when the Soviet Union was at the zenith of its power, 
in 1989 there was no possibility of financial support for East Germany from the East. 
Forced to look West for financial  help and facing massive political  protest the SED 
opened  the  border  crossings  in  the  Berlin  wall  and  the  East-West  division  was 
abrogated.
6.4.3 Who knew? Economics and the people
The parlous state of the East German economy has been thoroughly investigated in the 
years since reunification and the hardships visited on both East and West have been a 
major stumbling block on the road to a unified national identity. The economic situation 
of the GDR at the time of reunification is often pointed to as an impetus for the protests. 
However this seems to be an application of the benefit of hindsight. It is true that East 
Germans were relatively far worse off than those in the West, and while it is true that 
through the  expansion of  television  this  discrepancy was  more  evident  to  a  greater 
proportion of the population than ever before, the GDR was financing itself through 
debt rather than experiencing a drastic decline. If the new General Secretary of the SED 
was shocked at the state of the economy, it is unlikely that many East Germans had any 
inkling  of  how  dramatically  their  living  standards  would  have  to  drop  if  the  state 
continued to be independent. Although the economics of the situation greatly impacted 
143 'Document Number 19: Notes of CPSU Politburo Session, March 10 1988', in Savranskaya, Svetlana, 
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the relationship between the GDR and the Soviet Union, economic betterment was not 
the chief ambition of the protesters in 1989. In contrast, the 1953 uprising had a stronger 
economic motive than the 1989 protests that led to the revolution. The uprising in June 
1953 began as a workers protest where the workers were protesting at being forced to 
take a 10 percent pay cut. The brevity of the uprising and the speedy development of 
reunification  rhetoric  as  it  spread,  and  the  hagiographic  West  German  tradition  of 
praising  the  uprising  at  the  annual  'Tag  der  Deutschen  Einheit'  celebrations  helped 
obscure its mercantile origins. Only eight years after the close of the Second World War 
both  German  states  were  still  recovering  in  1953.  Although  the  Construction  of 
Socialism and the forced collectivisation and heavy industrial burden it entailed meant 
that in 1953 East Germany was also in worse shape than the West, the relative position 
of the two states was far less significant than it was in 1989.
Economic factors had a huge impact on the evolution and outcomes of the 1953 uprising 
and the 1989 revolution,  but I posit that in the subsequent literature this impact has 
frequently been muddled with the motivation and aims of the protesters. From a survey 
of the discourse around the two events,  one could get the impression that  the 1953 
uprising was inspired solely by a yearning for reunification and the 1989 revolution 
inspired by pecuniary jealousy. This curious inversion will be further explored after an 
investigation of the protesters,  those who inspired them, and an attempt to elucidate 
what they believed they were fighting for. 
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6.5 We are the people! The participants in the 1953 uprising and 
1989 revolution
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the events of 1953 and the events of 1989 
(apart from the outcome) was the duration of the protests and the level of participation 
by members of the public, church groups, and political forces. It may seem unhelpful to 
compare the level of participation in a protest movement that lasted months to one that 
lasted a few weeks and was defeated after a few days. But as Lämmel muses in the 
introduction  to  his  work  Der  17.  Juni  und  der  Herbst  1989  –  ein  (un)möglicher  
Vergleich?,  'schleißlich  bedeutet  Vergleich  nicht  Gleichsetzen.'144and the motivations 
and aims of the two movements have consistently been considered in tandem in the 
literature. I suggested at the end of the last section that the motives of the 1953 uprising 
were potentially more pecuniary in nature whereas the protest movement that led to the 
1989 revolution  was  more  focussed  on  political  rights.  But  from reading  the  bitter 
commentaries in newspapers reports and from authors such as Kupferberg it seems that 
events subsequent to the 1989 revolution have focussed unwarranted attention on the 
East  German   demand  for  Western  material  goods  and  have  reverse  engineered  a 
financial motive. On the other hand, 1953 had spent so long out of the public discussion, 
that  there  are  few  preconceptions  about  the  events  –  it  is  therefore  ripe  for 
mythologising. This next section will look at the social shape of the 1953 uprising and 
the 1989 revolution. 
144 Roy Lämmel, Der 17. Juni und der Herbst 1989 – ein (un)möglicher Vergleich?, (GRIN Verlag 2003) 
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6.5.1 The people of 1953
Ostermann estimates that more than 500,000 people took part in the protests in more 
than 560 locations across East Germany from the 16th to the 21st of June.145 In his 2005 
article 'Der “17. Juni 1953”; Eine historische Ortsbestimmungen' Ritter adds to this the 
second wave of protests  that  took place in July and states that during the June-July 
period there were incidents in 701 of the 5585 communities in East Germany which 
involved up to one million people over the course of the Uprising.146 Many studies have 
called the uprising of 1953 an 'Arbeiteraufstand' or 'workers uprising' but Ritter argues 
that the uprising developed out of workers strikes and into a movement that involved 
people of all classes and backgrounds.147  
In the days leading up to the major protests there were several small-scale industrial 
strikes.  The  majority  of  the  protests  were  stop-work  or  strike  action  within  the 
workplace, but some took their message to the streets. The 12th of June, the day after the 
'New Course' was announced, came the first such protest where six transport company 
workers held a demonstration in front of Brandenburg prison and were joined within an 
hour by a gathering of 5000 people. In their seminal work Untergang Auf Raten Mitter 
and Wolle cite this as evidence that the seething dissatisfaction of the population needed 
only  an  excuse  to  erupt.148 On  the  15th of  June  party  meetings  were  convened  at 
construction sites in Berlin, officially to thank the party for raising the work norms. 
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Unsurprisingly, the workers themselves expressed opinions that were not in line with 
this official purpose and the meetings were dominated by protests about the standards.149 
The workers on the construction site at Stalinallee Block 40 decided to send a petition to 
Grotewohl calling for the higher quotas to be rescinded. Grotewohl's aides advised him 
not to meet with the delegation and the workers were further frustrated by this apparent 
show of indifference. On the 16th of June an article in the union newspaper restating the 
need for the raising of the work norms led some 300 construction workers in Berlin to 
march on the SED headquarters. The banners they carried indicated that the protest had 
already broadened to political  issues as the workers demanded a real political  voice. 
Protesters on the 16th demanded to speak to Ulbricht and Grotewohl but only minor SED 
officials  would  meet  with  them.  They called  for  a  general  strike  the  next  day  and 
dispersed. On the 17th of June, groups of workers travelled to main centres to join the 
protests. 25,000 people had gathered in front of the House of Ministries in Berlin by 
9:00 a.m. Shortly after noon the uprising in Berlin was crushed by Soviet tanks. Other 
cities also had major protests brought down by the military. In Görlitz, for example, a 
crowd of 30,000 was dispersed by a reinforced armour battalion.150 It must be noted that 
these were not peaceful uprisings. The workers resorted to violence in many centres, a 
small number of party representatives were lynched and infrastructure was destroyed. 
The violent  nature of the uprising is  seldom discussed when 1953 is  evoked as the 
predecessor for 1989.
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Thus far the workers were directing and instigating the protests but there were women, 
students and farmers joining the movement as well. The protests that continued through 
the month of June and into July after the Soviet intervention moved to smaller centres 
and had a  higher proportion of agricultural  workers involved.151 These later  protests 
have  received  less  attention  in  the  literature  about  the  1953 uprisings  because  they 
appear to have had a lesser impact on the evolution of GDR policy and response of the 
SED to the crisis.  Although the politburo  denounced the  uprising  as  a  fascist  coup 
attempt as early as the 18th of July in an article in  Neues Deutschland, the politburo 
recognised the seriousness of the situation. A communique from the 21st of June states 
'when the masses of workers do not understand the party, then the party is guilty, not the 
workers.'152 Ostermann concludes that the lasting impacts of the uprising on the SED 
state  were  the  expansion  of  the  state  security  mechanism  in  the  GDR,  the  SED 
becoming fearful  of the people,  and an 'implicit  agreement  between the regime and 
labour' which ultimately contributed to the stability of the SED state and the stagnancy 
of the economy.153 
Civil society groups and the 1953 uprising
Another  interesting  line  of  inquiry  is  looking  at  who  wasn't involved  in  the  1953 
uprisings. When preparing for a comparison to the events of 1989 in which emerging 
civic  groups  and church  organisations  played  a  visible  role  we must  ask  why they 
played no apparent role in 1953. Analysing an absence may seem like a foolish task, but 
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in the case of the protestant church – which had been singled out for persecution under 
the Construction of Socialism – the uprisings could have been an opportunity for the 
church to air its grievances., given that the precedent existed – the persecution of the 
protestant churches under the Construction of Socialism was not on ideological grounds 
– the churches had strongly protested the falsified election results in 1950.154 Afraid of 
the appeal of religion and the community support the churches received, the church was 
attacked as a part of the old fascist system, accused of complicity with the National 
Socialists. Theological students and theologians were thrown in jail as spies, children of 
religious  families  refused  education,  and  bishops  and  other  important  figures  were 
harassed and kept under surveillance. The SED 'Kirchenkampf'  (church war) equated 
the church to the Nazis.155 Then, on the 10th of June 1953, Grotewohl announced to a 
shocked church hierarchy that the persecution was to cease and the state was willing to 
enter into dialogue. The church had no time to react to this sudden about-face before the 
June uprising began. The church was unable to meet to decide how it would respond to 
the uprising and, wary of losing their new-found freedom from persecution, some, such 
as  the  bishop  of  Thüringen,  went  to  great  lengths  to  distance  themselves  from the 
protests. However, on the 24th of June, a gathering of church leaders submitted a letter to 
Semyonov calling for clemency.156 The reactions of the church show an organisation on 
the back foot, but their confusion may have worked in their favour in the long run – they 
could be neither accused of fomenting unrest by the authorities, nor of abandoning the 
people. As the only major non-governmental civil society group to have survived in the 
GDR the  actions  and reactions  of  the church  are representative  of  how the  relative 
154 Bernd Eisenfeld, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, & Ehrhart Neubert, Die verdrängte Revolution: der Platz  
des 17. Juni 1953 in der deutschen Geschichte, (Edition Temmen, 2004) p. 118 - 119
155 Ibid. p. 118 - 119
156 Ibid. p. 121
72
brevity of the 1953 uprising and its brutal suppression and speedy disappearance from 
public discussion give it huge potential as a historical symbol. Although the proportion 
of the population involved and the support from the non-governmental groups do not 
compare with 1989 the limited time-scale  repercussions create  space for speculation 
about what could have happened had circumstances been different. 
6.5.2 The people of the 1989 revolution
The roots  of  1953 are  usually  traced  back to  the  beginning  of  the  Construction  of 
Socialism.  The  beginnings  of  1989  are  harder  to  pin  point.  News  of  Gorbachev's 
glastnost and  perestroika initiatives are generally accepted to be the impetus, but it is 
difficult to know when this news began filtering into the GDR. Maier traces the earliest 
rumblings  of  dissent  back  to  January  1988  when  the  SED began  censoring  Soviet 
publications,  the  disappearance  of  Sputnik magazine  from  kiosks  signalled  to  the 
population that the SED was not planning on emulating any of the Soviet reforms.157 In 
January of 1989, the first protest in Leipzig – which became an important protest centre 
–  called  for  the  release  of  prisoners  and  the  demanded  that  Sputnik  be  reissued.158 
Another factor discussed earlier was the awareness of the population of their situation 
relative to those in the West through the spread of television in the GDR. The people of 
Leipzig  realised  that  this  medium  could  also  offer  an  opportunity  to  press  their 
government for reforms. In March 1989 when the international trade fair was held in 
Leipzig hundreds of demonstrators called for travel rights in front of Western television 
cameras and the police were filmed 'roughing up' and arresting demonstrators who fled 
157 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton 
University Press, 1999. p. 121-122
158 Carol Mueller 'Claim "Radicalization?" The 1989 Protest Cycle in the GDR' Social Problems, Vol. 46, 
No. 4 (Nov., 1999), pp. 528-547, p. 528
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into the church.159 From this time, the Monday night peace prayers at the Nikolaikirche 
became more crowded and the church resisted state demands to cancel  the services. 
After the disputed elections on the 7th of May the prayer meetings became a recognised 
centre  of protest  and the police began menacing attendees  with their  presence.  It  is 
difficult  to calculate  the proportion of the population involved in the protests  in the 
autumn of 1989. In her paper Mueller instead focuses on the exponential growth of the 
size of protests during the course of 1989 as they swelled from small peace prayers to a 
peak  of  one  million  in  Alexanderplatz  in  November  –  at  the  same  time  that 
demonstrations were being held in more and more small  provincial centres. There is 
little doubt that there was broad based support for the protests of 1989; Maier writes that 
the 'momentum for liberalization was intense'.160 
Civil society in 1989
One key difference between 1953 and 1989 is the development of a political opposition 
to the SED. This would not have been possible over the short period in which the 1953 
uprisings took place; indeed the protestant church did not have a chance to decide upon 
a unified position before the climax of the uprising had passed. But during 1989 there 
was the time, the determination and the cultural resources to create ideas about a new 
future. Maier considers those who were  protesting in Leipzig in the earlier months of 
1989 to be of two groups;
159 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton 
University Press, 1999. p. 135
160 Ibid. 134
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earnest prayer participants motivated by human rights, peace and other public issues 
[and]  the  old  working  classes  of  the  metropolitan  area  distressed  by  the  region's 
declining industrial base, decaying housing and inadequate transportation...161
The involvement of the church was less expected, perhaps, than in 1953. From the end 
of the 1950s the SED had established a state church and protestant religion formed an 
uneasy truce with the government. However, when the opportunity arose, the church 
council  decided  that  this  time  they would  be  on  the  side  of  the  people.162 From a 
confluence of these two groups came the founding of the New Forum which called for 
broad based political dialogue. The relationship between the New Forum and the street 
protests  was  not  direct,  with  the  New  Forum  distancing  itself  from  the  actual 
demonstrations,  but the endorsements  that  it  received from church members,  human 
rights activists, and even pop and rock performers shows the broad public appeal of 
such  an  organisation.  The  fact  that  the  civic  movement  in  East  Germany  was  a 
movement  which  called  for  reform rather  than  reunification  was  disregarded in  the 
euphoria  following  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  wall.  Intellectuals  who  had  supported  the 
protest movement were disappointed by what they saw as the sacrifice of democracy for 
consumerism. The leaders of civic groups were alarmed by the nationalistic expressions 
of the people and the press and hoped that reform would win over reunification.163 These 
voices have yet to be reconciled with the creation of a new national story for a Germany 
that belongs together and exercises its right to be so. 
161 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton 
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6.5.3 Comparing Volk with Volk; what the comparison tells us
From the distance of over half a century the people of 1953 have crystallised into types. 
There are those who worked for the state and there are the common people. Amongst 
the common people we can see two types, those who participated in the uprising, and 
those who didn't. Those who did not participate have no place in the history of that time. 
The historical proximity of the revolution of 1989 makes it more difficult to paint in 
broad strokes – there is still  too much memory,  too many mixed opinions,  to many 
counter narratives. But comparison always involves simplification; in order to compare 
two  situations  we  must  find  factors  which  compare  or  contrast  in  roughly  equal 
proportions. Thus in comparing a year of peaceful protest culminating in revolution to a 
brief and violent uprising, we will stretch out some factors and shrink others so they will 
fit within the framework of the comparison. But even if we accept that in comparing the 
aims and motivations of the protesters in 1953 and 1989 we are comparing movements 
that took place on a very different time-scale, there are few points of convergence which 
can be found. For the purposes of creating a narrative which legitimises reunification by 
demonstrating that the people of East Germany were always looking for an opportunity 
to free themselves from SED oppression, only one thing matters – that in both 1953 and 
1989 the people called for free and fair all-German elections. But as we can see from 
the development  of the two movements  this  was never the sole – or even the most 
important – aim of the people. 
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7.Conclusions
7.1 The lessons of comparison; the parallels and  
differences between 1953 and 1989
A recap of the salient points from the comparison between the events of 1953 and 1989 
and what can be made of these similarities and differences. 
 The first point examined was the attitudes and actions of West Germany and its 
Western allies to the 1953 uprising and the 1989 revolution. It was concluded 
that there was little change in the goals of the west between 1953 and 1989 – 
West Germany's chief ally, the United States, was willing to support unification 
but not at the expense of West German involvement in NATO and integration 
into Western Europe. West Germany had undergone huge changes by 1989. In 
1953, a mere eight years after the end of the Second World War the FRG was 
afraid  of  being  overrun  by  the  Red  Army  and  paranoid  about  communist 
revolution from within. In 1989 West Germany was a secure, sovereign state and 
from its position of strength, West Germany was more able to support the goal 
of  reunification,  but  it  still  played  no major  role  in  the  development  of  the 
revolution. The consistency of the Western approach to the protest movements 
in  the  GDR both  gives  and relevant  point  of  comparison  and their  subdued 
reaction contributes to the narrative of a people standing against their unjust and 
unpopular government. 
 Next the similarities between the unpopular leadership of Ulbricht in 1953 and 
the unpopular leadership of Honecker in 1989 were examined. It is significant 
for  the  national  story  of  a  reunified  Germany  that  both  the  major  protest 
movements were movements against the communist leadership and not, as was 
the case in  the Hungarian  Uprising and the  Prague Spring,  movements  from 
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within the party seeking to reform against the wishes of the Soviet Union. Had 
either of these protest movements been directed against the Soviet Union rather 
than against the SED state, they would lose much of their potency as evidence 
that the people of East Germany were seeking freedom and democracy through 
unification and not through the reform of their own state. 
 It  seems  strange  when  we  think  of  the  anti-communist  protests  which  have 
become  iconic  in  the  West  –  the  aforementioned  Prague  Spring  and  1956 
Hungarian Uprising – that in contrast both of the East German events we have 
been examining were inspired by Soviet-instigated liberalisations. However, this 
can be seen as tying back in to the unpopularity of the contemporary leadership. 
The people of the GDR saw the potential for change from examples within the 
eastern block when the SED was unable to offer it. This point is more relevant 
for the 1989 revolution than the 1953 uprising. While the population in 1953 
was confused about the new course, in 1989 the people of the GDR rose up 
when they were denied  glastnost and  perestroika. However, in both cases, the 
protests quickly became calls for free elections. In 1989 there were also voices 
calling for reform within the GDR but in the comparison these voices fade away. 
 The economic situation in East Germany in both 1953 and 1989 was dire and 
therefore it is easy to draw a parallel between the situations – but to what end? 
The state of the East German economy and the size of its debt to West Germany 
at the time of reunification are probably subjects that historians comparing 1953 
and 1989 would like to avoid, such is the residual resentment from both sides of 
the old divide about the impact of reunification on the German economy. But the 
economic  situation  was in  both cases part  and parcel  of the need to  reform, 
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which was recognised by the Soviet masters and picked up by the people of the 
GDR. 
 Finally this essay considered the comparison in terms of the people involved. 
This is perhaps the least comparable aspect of the two and the comparison is 
therefore the most dangerous. By equating the multifarious drawn out protest 
movement preceding the revolution of 1989 with the short, explosive expression 
of anger that was the 1953 uprising, the complexity of the 1989 story is lost and 
the story of 1953 is confused. The disappointment and disillusionment felt by 
some at the disappearance of their state has no place in that narrative of national 
unity. So the comparison of 1953 and 1989 becomes a dichotomy, the first failed 
in the face of military might and this was bad for the people of the GDR, the 
second succeeded because circumstances were in favour of change and this was 
good for the people.  But if 1953 and 1989 are comparable in their  historical 
circumstances, and not in the aims and desires of their participants surely this 
should cast significant doubt on the wisdom of the exercise. 
The comparison between 1953 and 1989 appears to be ein möglicher Vergleich in terms 
of economic and political circumstances, but ein unmöglicher Vergleich in terms of the 
people and their hope and aims. Despite half a century of social history demonstrating 
the importance of understanding the lived reality of the common people, the comparison 
between  1953  and  1989  demonstrates  that  when  politics  and  history  intersect  the 
emotive, triumphant narrative wins out over the complexity of experience. 
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7.2 The impact on the German story
In the post-Ostalgie world where the discussion of life in the GDR has stopped being 
presented entirely in the negative,  new narratives about East Germany are emerging 
which  are  at  a  sharp  variance  to  the  nation  building  narrative.  For  example  Mark 
Allinson based his work  Politics and popular opinion in East Germany 1945 – 68 on 
the assumption that for most of its history the GDR was a stable state. He based this 
assumption 'on the general absence of popular uprisings and political adventurism, the 
only  notable  exception  being  the  events  surrounding  17  June  1953.'164 Allinson's 
assertion that:
[a] situation of overwhelming active or passive support of the system existed for over 
forty years is a historical fact, however uncomfortable that might have appeared after  
1989 in either eastern or western Germany.165 
contains accusations of complicity that cannot coexist with the narrative of the heroic 
East German people who took every opportunity to free themselves from oppression. In 
the face of such challenges the comparison between 1953 and 1989 provides a simple 
narrative which shows the people of East Germany to have been German patriot-in-
waiting for the entire existence of the separate state. 
To pose the title of this essay as a question; how is the comparison between the 1953 
uprising and the 1989 revolution contributing  to a new German story?  As a  history 
written to serve a nation-building political narrative, the comparison between 1953 and 
1989 has been weighted heavily on the side of Gleichsetzung  (equation) rather than 
Vergleich (comparison) which does justice to neither the people of 1953 nor of 1989. As 
164 Mark Allinson, Politics and Popular Opinion in East Germany 1945 – 68, (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester and New York 2000). p. 3
165 Ibid. p. 4
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a historical tool, comparison is useful to elucidate changing social reality, but as a tool 
of politico-national history writing it must be used with caution. National identity relies 
on emotive responses from the national group. The 1953 'memory marathon' was not an 
appeal for the events of 1953 in themselves to be remembered, rather it was an appeal 
for the German people to identify 1953 as a moment in their history which could be 
remembered with pride. Through the comparative lens this was also a call for pride in 
1989. Through building a new national  narrative around the triumph of the German 
people over unpopular regimes, the unified Germany is reinventing itself in more ways 
than it seems. The narrative of 1953 and 1989 is not just one which aims to include the 
people  of  the  former  GDR in  the  national  story.  Lauding  the  achievements  of  the 
peaceful revolution of 1989 and the courage of the protesters of 1953, is a step back 
towards a traditional  national  history.  In June of 2003, President  Rau told a special 
session of parliament in Berlin; 'There are so many days in our history associated with 
defeats or mistakes, June 17 is one of the proud days in German history.'166 Rau was not 
calling  for  the  people  of  Germany  to  be  proud  that  the  frustrated  people  of  East 
Germany turned to violent protest in 1953, he was appealing to a tradition created in the 
service of political ideals. 
166 Czuczka, Tony, 'Germans commemorate forgotten 1953 uprising, seeking east-west bond', Associated 
Press Worldstream, June 17 2003
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